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DOES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS?: WEST LYNN
CREAMERY v. HEALY
[G]overnment is 'to do for the people what needs to be done,
but which they cannot, by individual effort, do at all, or do so
well, for themselves.' Public goods satisfy this description for
these are goods that will not be efficiently provided by a pure
market mechanism.'
The Framers of the Constitution drafted the Commerce Clause' during
a period of economic rivalry among the states.' These origins arguably
led to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation that the Com-
merce Clause limits the states' power to regulate interstate commerce,
1. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMics 312 (14th ed. 1992)
(quoting in part Abraham Lincoln). "Public goods are ones whose benefits are indivisibly
spread among the entire community, whether or not individuals desire to purchase the
public good." Id. at 311.
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " Id.
3. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 515-16, (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987). The Commerce Clause is
designed to prevent the interstate economic rivalry that developed during the Confedera-
tion. Id. The problems of commerce among the confederate states had been attributed to
their failure to surrender interstate commerce power to the Congress of the Confederation.
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrTUTION 567-68 (1937); The Honorable
John Lansing, Debate of the New York adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 20,
1788), in ELLIOT'S DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 218 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
vol. 11, 1901); JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-45 (2nd ed. 1983).
Following the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the states lost Great Britain as
their major international trading partner resulting in a smaller market for goods produced
by the states. Id. This decrease in market size compelled the states to implement protec-
tive measures for the benefit of in-state producers. Id. During the Constitutional Conven-
tion for example, because New York owned a lighthouse in New Jersey, New York charged
an entrance and clearance fee on ships bound to or from New Jersey or Connecticut. WIL-
LIAM PETERS, A MORE PERFEcT UNION 48-49 (1987). New Jersey retaliated, placing a tax
on New York's lighthouse. Id. at 49. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1091,
1114 (1986) (arguing that the drafters of the Constitution were cognizant of potentially
dangerous economic rivalries among the states). Manufacturing and shipping had been
adversely affected by the government under the Articles of Confederation, so reform-
minded interests were represented at the Constitutional Convention. Charles A. Beard,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 39,
44-47 (Bertell Ollman & Jonathan Birnbaum eds., 1990).
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even when Congress has not spoken.4 State laws discriminating against
out-of-state producers have been invalidated by the courts under the the-
ory that the drafters of the Commerce Clause envisioned an economic
union among the states.' In short, this negative aspect of the Commerce
Clause6 limits a state's power to adopt regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce. 7 When states attempt to improve the effi-
ciency of the market by internalizing the external costs of public goods,
however, they may facially appear to be discriminating against out-of-
state producers.8
4. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1991) (holding that state legislation that is
protectionist or discriminatory violates the Commerce Clause principle of free trade); Jo-
seph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 427 (1947) (describing the
Clause's abridgement of state power, the Court states "[t]his has arisen from long-contin-
ued judicial interpretation that, without congressional action, the words themselves of the
Commerce Clause forbid undue interferences by the states with interstate commerce
..... ); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 374 (1964); Milk
Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1939) (contending that the
Commerce Clause "necessarily implies" that the states' power to regulate commerce is
subordinate to the power expressly granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause); Steam-
ship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1867) (holding that the commerce power had
been granted to Congress so as to avoid the "interruption or embarrassment arising from
the conflicting or hostile State regulations" of interstate commerce). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1824) (stating that "[a] power in the States to do any thing, and
every thing, in regard to commerce, till Congress shall undo it, would suppose a state of
things, at least as bad as that which existed before the present constitution"). See Steven
Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 OR. L.
REV. 895, 899-901 (1990) (discussing the possibility that the Court has interpreted the Con-
stitution as mandating an economic union among the states).
5. Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 374. The drafters of the Constitution enacted the
Commerce Clause in response to economic rivalry among the states. Id.; Gibbons, 22 U.S.
at 11-13 (contending that the state of trade and commerce had been a driving force in the
adoption of the Constitution); see also NOWAK, supra note 3, at 145-46 (describing the
problems with interstate commerce that the Constitution was designed to resolve).
6. Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg,
57 ALa. L. REv. 1215, 1215-16 (1994). The negative or dormant Commerce Clause prohib-
its states from regulating certain types of interstate commerce, even when Congress has not
affirmatively regulated in that area. See Breker-Cooper, supra note 4, at 896. Experts ar-
gue that the negative Commerce Clause should not be utilized because only Congress
should exercise the exclusive power granted to it under the Commerce Clause. Id.; Julian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 427-28 (1982).
7. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1206 (arguing that the Supreme Court is properly
utilizing the negative Commerce Clause to invalidate protectionist state legislation).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 252-306 (discussing the economic impact, which
facially appeared to be similar to that of a tariff, of a tax and subsidy scheme designed, in
part, to internalize the costs of the external benefits of undeveloped land occupied by dairy
farmers).
Commerce Clause
The negative, or dormant, Commerce Clause9 generates tension be-
tween the text of the Constitution,'" notions of federalism," and the effi-
cient maintenance of the economic union.'2 In particular, the dormant
Commerce Clause violates the constitutional principles of federalism and
separation of powers.' 3 The Constitution clearly allows Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce and invalidate any inconsistent state regulation
under the Supremacy Clause. 4 The Court's encroachment of congres-
sional power is evident in the rare cases in which Congress overrules the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence,' 5 thus, as-
9. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988) (stating that the
"negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause directly limits States' power to protect their
markets and discriminate against interstate commerce); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137
(1986) (discussing the Court's power under the dormant Commerce Clause); see Regan,
supra note 3, at 1093 (finding that the dormant or negative Commerce Clause prohibits
state protectionist legislation).
10. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, DUKE L.J. 569, 571 (1987) (arguing that there is no
textual support in the Constitution for the negative Commerce Clause); c.f., Breker-
Cooper, supra note 4, at 899-902 (discussing that the fact-finding process necessary for
Commerce Clause determinations is vested in Congress by the Constitution, thus making it
theoretically impossible for the Court to independently determine whether a burden on
interstate commerce is impermissible).
11. See Redish and Nugent, supra note 10, at 573-74 (contending that the negative
Commerce Clause disrupts the Constitutional balance of power between the states and the
federal government); see also Richard S. Myers, The Burger Court and the Commerce
Clause: An Evaluation of the Role of State Sovereignty, 60 NoTRM DAME L. REv. 1056,
1057 (1985) (discussing the Burger Court's unsuccessful attempts at preserving the balance
of power between the states and the national government under the Commerce Clause).
12. See Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. Rav. 409, 449, 454-56 (1992).
McGinley argues that, rather than responding to commerce issues on a case-by-case basis,
Congress may effectuate its will under the Commerce Clause through broad legislation of
free trade causes of action. Id. But see Regan, supra note 3, at 1143-47 (praising motive
review under the dormant Commerce Clause).
13. See Petragnani, supra note 6, at 1215, 1243-44 (contending that the dormant Com-
merce Clause requires the Court to exercise legislative judgments, contrary to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine). Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
subjects state economic policy to review by the branch of the federal government subject to
the least state influence. Id. at 1247. The Court's usurpation of Congressional commerce
power greatly limits the states' commercial power in the federal system. Id. at 1247-48.
14. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 (1949) (stating that Con-
gress "could prohibit or curtail shipments of milk in interstate commerce" or authorize the
states to do so); Wabash, St. Louis & Pa. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) (invalidat-
ing an Illinois statute banning discriminatory pricing by interstate carriers for the intrastate
part of a train ride because the Commerce Clause demands that Congress should regulate
the area); see Breker-Cooper, supra note 4, at 895, n.3 (stating that Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause is not limited).
15. See Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122
(1988)) (overruling Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888));
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serting their exclusive control of commerce under the Constitution. 16
While the Constitution affirmatively grants Congress power to regulate
commerce, 17 there is no clear limitation on state power in areas where
Congress has not acted.18 The Supreme Court, however, infers such a
limitation under the negative Commerce Clause.' 9
Additionally, the Court has stated that the Tenth Amendment2" does
not limit Congress' Commerce Clause power,2' or implicitly the Court's
application of the negative Commerce Clause.22 An active judiciary in
this area may invalidate state regulations, despite the fact that Congress
may have approved of the state action 23 or at the very least would have
Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1988)) (overruling
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890)).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (stating that Congress may regu-
late commerce so long as it does not violate a constitutional prohibition in the process).
18. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1986) (contending that the Commerce
Clause limits, but does not forbid, state commercial legislation); Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 426 (1947) (finding that the Constitution does not
expressly limit a state's power to tax within its borders); see Eule, supra note 6, at 430
(arguing that the Commerce Clause was enacted, not as a prohibition against protection-
ism, but as a transfer of commerce power to Congress).
19. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (stating that even though
there is no textual support in the Constitution for the negative Commerce Clause, it has
gradually developed from the Court's jurisprudence). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 13 (1824) (contending that the Constitution would not have been "worth ac-
cepting" if the Commerce Clause granted the states concurrent power over commerce); cf.,
Regan, supra note 3, at 1125 (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
create the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
21. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968) (holding that Congress' commerce
power is not limited merely because a state is involved); Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (holding
that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered"); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 59 (1921) (stating that Congress,
as compared to the states, has superior power to regulate commerce among the states).
22. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (contending that the Tenth Amendment merely affirms
the relationship between the national and state governments as represented in the Consti-
tution prior to the adoption of the Tenth Amendment); see also Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86
YALE L.J. 1552, 1586 (1977). Professor Choper argues that "[c]ontinuing judicial oversight
of alleged state encroachments on national power can also be justified on functional
grounds. First, Congress has never established internal machinery for bringing to its atten-
tion the myriad of state and local rules that may arguably intrude on the national domain."
Id.
23. Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act which authorized the states to regu-
late the sale of insurance policies. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988).
Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944)
(holding that Congress constitutionally regulated the sale of insurance policies pursuant to
its powers under the Commerce Clause) with Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869) (holding
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Commerce Clause
supported local economic experimentation for the benefit of future fed-
eral legislation.24
Leaving state commercial legislation to the will of Congress, which is
restrained by the people,25 could prevent the invalidation of beneficial
state economic experimentation.26 Economic experimentation is needed
to resolve a fundamental problem of the free market;27 namely, that it
fails to internalize external costs. 8 Similarly, when making production
that the states may regulate the issuance of insurance policies because they are not com-
merce), overruled by South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 533; see Choper, supra
note 22, at 1587 n.194 (discussing the consequences of judicial error when the Court is
utilizing legislative-like balancing).
24. See Choper, supra note 22, at 1587 n.194. A state's power to fund its interests is
paramount to the concept of federalism. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) (discussing the importance and the distribution of "sover-
eignty" among the state and national governments). Subsidies may damage an economic
union, which the Supreme Court attempts to preserve under the Commerce Clause. See
NOWAK, supra note 3, at 146-47. This friction is analogous to the conflicts that countries
have been trying to resolve in efforts to facilitate free trade. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 757-61 (1995) (discussing
the international impact of subsidies).
25. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938) (stating that federal abuse of taxa-
tion power may be reliably prevented by the states' representatives in Congress); THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) James Madison
believed that the federal government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit of [the states] to
be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their
governments." Id. Madison relied on equal state representation in the Senate as a Palla-
dium to the portion of the sovereignty retained by the States, and an institution for pre-
serving that residual sovereignty. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278-79 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see STORY, supra note 3, at § 277.
26. See LEONARD SILK, ECONOMICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 39-41 (1986) (discussing E. F.
Schumacher's argument that proper changes in the economic system would benefit soci-
ety). E. F. Schumacher contends that the axioms of economics, unlike those of the natural
sciences and mathematics, can be created by the participants in the system. Id. at 39. The
axiom of economics is not a question of supply and demand, which is a given, but instead it
is a question of, "[W]hat does it mean for something to be economical? ... The goal of
economic activity ought not to be to produce as much as possible, but to enable people to
gain the most utility and comfort while using up the least amount of resources-especially
irreplaceable resources .... " Id. at 39-41.
27. See infra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing the free market's failure to
internalize external costs and benefits, which leads to misallocations of resources).
28. J. PHILIP WOGAMAN, THE GREAT ECONOMIC DEBATE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 93
(1977) (discussing capitalism's failure to internalize external costs and benefits); Alasdair
MacIntyre, Power Industry Morality, SYMPOSIUM: A REPORT FROM THE EDISON ELECTRIC
INSTITUTE (1981) reprinted in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 233, 235 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds. 3d ed. 1988) (contending that the market "is of no
help to us in those areas of life where we have to decide what our patterns of consumption
are to be, how our preferences are to be ranked, [and] how our desires are to be ordered");
cf. JACOB NEEDLEMAN, MONEY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 25-28 (1991) (arguing that the
free market generates too many goods that do not necessarily improve the quality of life,
while neglecting many noneconomic goods that raise the true affluence of society).
1995]
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decisions industry treats resources identically, irrespective of whether
those resources are renewable, long term renewable, 29 or nonrenew-
able.3" This indiscriminate treatment inevitably leads to the overcon-
sumption of nonrenewable and long term renewable resources. 31  For
example, undeveloped land is a resource that may be reacquired only
over the long run,32 and it produces external benefits for which its owner
is not compensated.33 A state may address these market failures with
subsidies that conform production to its true costs.
3 4
29. ALBERT N. LINK, LINK'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS,
171 (1993). The long run is the time it takes to change all factors of production. Id. The
long run for a dairy farmer is the time it would take to change the level of all his inputs:
land, dairy cows, equipment, and labor. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at
112-13 (discussing the economic concept of the long run).
30. See WOGAMAN, supra note 28, at 142-43. Industry treats resources such as fossil
fuels which "took nature billions of years to create" in the same manner as renewable
resources, such as labor, when making production decisions. Id. at 142. Professor Samuel-
son alludes to the market's inability to properly allocate nonrenewable resources and to
internalize external costs and benefits:
Say the federal government wants to drill for oil off the California coast. A storm
of complaints is heard. A defender of the program states, "What's all the ruckus
about? There's valuable oil out there, and there is plenty of seawater to go
around. This is very low-cost oil for the nation."
See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 131. The complainants are voicing their
concerns over the potential costs of an oil spill that may damage a long term renewable
resource (the clean coast and the corresponding marine life).
31. See WOGAMAN, supra note 28, at 142 (discussing the problem of overconsumption
of nonrenewable resources and resources that are only renewable over the long run). Not
only may nonrenewable resources be depleted, but many of the earth's resources will not
allow for infinite growth. Id. at 139-43. John Stuart Mill argued the intuitive proposition
that infinite growth is impossible in a finite world:
It must have always have been seen, more or less distinctly, by political econo-
mists, that the increase in wealth is not boundless: that at the end of what they
term the progressive state lies the stationary state, that all progress in wealth is
but a postponement of this, and that each step in advance is an approach to it...
Id. at 139 (quoting John Stuart Mill).
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the economic concept of the
long run).
33. NOAH M. LEMos, INTRINSIC VALUE 120 (1994). The intrinsic value of an object is
arguably constituted, in part, by social scientific facts, such as those deduced by economics.
See id. Undeveloped land generates real benefits, some for which the owner of that prop-
erty will not receive compensation. See id. at 194 (discussing the philosophical concept of
value); see SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 131, 311-12 (discussing the eco-
nomic concepts of external costs and benefits, and opportunity costs).
34. See JACKSON, supra note 24, at 1169-71 (discussing the international use of agricul-
tural subsidies to internalize the external benefits (national security and stable food prices)
of farming); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REv.
1097, 1134-39 (1988) (discussing the economic effects of subsidies).
Commerce Clause
State expenditures favoring in-state producers also discriminate against
out-of-state producers, 35 but such expenditures are less likely than tar-
iffs3 6 to damage competition because, while tariffs effectively restrict mar-
ket access, subsidies encourage market participation.37  The lack of
offense found in subsidies is reflected by the general rule that subsidizing
an in-state industry does not violate the Commerce Clause. 38 Tradition-
ally, courts tolerate subsidies because subsidies often can produce benefi-
cial social as well as economic consequences, and regulating them would
be administratively difficult. 39 The United States Supreme Court never
35. See ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 776 (1989). If a foreign government subsi-
dizes an industry, domestic producers, who must compete against the subsidized goods, are
first to object to the resulting inequity. Id. The unfairness arises from a subsidized foreign
producer increasing its domestic market share at the expense of nonsubsidized domestic
producers. See id.; cf Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135 (explaining this same inequity suf-
fered by a foreign producer in a subsidized domestic market).
36. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 747. A tariff is a tax imposed
on each unit of an imported product. Id.
37. See Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135. The argument is made that import tariffs and
domestic subsidies both result in a lower appeal of the foreign product. Id. But, in effect,
subsidies increase the competitive advantage of the party being subsidized, while tariffs
reduce the competitive advantage of the producers who are subject to the tariff. Id. Econ-
omists also prefer subsidies to tariffs as a way of achieving social goals because subsidies do
not raise the price of products. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 683. In
addition, subsidies, like any expenditure, are more visible and therefore are more likely to
generate debate. Id.
38. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988) (reasoning that direct
subsidization of an in-state industry generally does not violate the Commerce Clause but
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does).
39. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983) (dismissing petitioner's contention that generally available benefits should be action-
able subsidies under the Tariff Act of 1930 because it would lead to the absurd result of
declaring the construction of roads and bridges as actionable subsidies); see PPG Indus-
tries, Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1570, 1574 (Cl. Ct. 1991) (stating that an actiona-
ble subsidy under the Tariff Act of 1930, does not, as a matter of law, include economic
benefits conferred on a foreign industry by its government). There does not exist an inter-
nationally accepted definition of what distinguishes an unfair subsidy from a fair subsidy.
Id. at 1574; see also Gergen, supra note 34, at 1136 (stating that the difference between
subsidies and market interfering prohibitions, like tariffs, is only one of degree). But see
Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 584
(1983) (discussing the reasons for the courts' preferential treatment of subsidies as com-
pared to tariffs).
The failure of commerce clause [sic] objections to a state's expenditures in favor
of its own citizens follows rather neatly from the realization that such payments
are positive inducements that stimulate output rather than restrict it to monopoly
levels .... Although [subsidies] might well cause overproduction as inefficient as
a monopoly's underproduction, the legislating state itself pays for its action rather
than profits from it, so that the legislature's judgment may be thought more relia-
ble than parochial.
1995]
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specifically has addressed the constitutionality of subsidies.4 ° In West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy41 (Healy II), the Supreme Court addressed
whether a facially nondiscriminatory tax coupled with a direct subsidy
violated the Commerce Clause.42 In Healy II, the Court failed to resolve
the issue of subsidies,43 but more importantly, the Court reaffirmed that
the American economic union is a laissez-faire union.
44
In West Lynn Creamery v. Healy (Healy i),41 the West Lynn Creamery
sought review of a nondiscriminatory Massachusetts dealer tax and do-
mestic producer subsidy plan for the dairy industry. 46 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that a subsidy to in-state dairy farmers
funded by a tax47 levied on all dairy dealers selling milk in-state regard-
less of its origin48 only burdened interstate commerce incidentally. 9 The
proceeds from the tax benefitted solely in-state dairy farmers by way of
But, Professor Gergen argues that subsidies always have a cost to those outside the pro-
vider state because they impose losses on the unsubsidized foreign industry and market.
Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135-36. However, Professor Gergen states that a general rule
against "subsidies would be difficult to administer because of the problems in distinguish-
ing preferences in the allocation of public services from subsidies that improve the position
of a state's citizens in the market." Id. at 1134.
40. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994); see Limbach, 486
U.S. at 278 (stating that directly subsidizing domestic business does not violate the Com-
merce Clause absent a discriminatory tax); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67
(1982) (Brennan J., concurring) (contending that a state may attract industry and residents
by spending money to improve the business and social environment).
41. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
42. Id. at 2209. In particular, the pricing order required payment by all dairy dealers
who sold their product in Massachusetts. Id. at 2210. The proceeds of the payments were
then distributed to in-state dairy farmers only. Id.
43. See id. at 2214 n.15 (stating that the Court will not settle the constitutionality of
subsidies in this case).
44. See id. at 2218 (discussing the virtues of a free market economy); see SAMUELSON
AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 740. A laissez-faire economy is driven by the market-
place with minimal government interference. Id.
45. 611 N.E.2d 239 (Mass. 1993).
46. Id. at 240-41.
47. See id. at 241 n.10. The tax, stemming from the state's pricing order, is calculated
as one-third of the difference between the federal blend price of $12.00 and $15.00 (an
amount fixed by the Massachusetts order), multiplied by the amount of the dealers Class I
(fluid milk) sales in Massachusetts. Id. at 241 n.9, n.10.
48. Id. at 240 n.3 (defining dealer).
"A 'dealer' is defined as 'any person who is engaged within the Commonwealth in
the business of receiving, purchasing, pasteurizing, bottling, processing, distribut-
ing, or otherwise handling milk, purchases or receives milk for sale as the con-
signee or agent of a producer, and shall include a producer-dealer, dealer-retailer,
and sub-dealer.'"
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2210 n.4 (1994).
49. Healy I, 611 N.E.2d at 245.
[Vol. 44:977
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subsidy payments from the Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund."°
The purpose of the fund was not only to rescue the ailing Massachusetts
dairy industry, but also to help preserve the vast tracts of scenic land that
composed the dairy farms and drew tourists."' Massachusetts' pricing
scheme was an innovative economic experiment designed to serve both
environmental and protectionist goals.5 2
West Lynn Creamery, a dairy dealer, alleged that the tax and subsidy
plan violated the Commerce Clause because it protected only in-state
dairy farmers.5 3 The Creamery asserted that the tax unconstitutionally
discriminated against out-of-state dairy farmers because the fund pay-
ments, which were supported by the dealer tax, subsidized only in-state
dairy farmers.5 4 Moreover, it argued that the discriminatory effect of the
fund distribution scheme would result in reduced Massachusetts milk im-
ports and increased domestic production. 5 Refusing to accept any of
the Creamery's claims, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts up-
50. Id. at 241. Massachusetts maintained its Dairy Equalization Fund separately from
the state's general fund. Id. The Dairy Equalization Fund was used solely to subsidize in-
state, dairy farmers. Id.
51. Id. at 240 n.6. The state determined that the dairy crisis threatened "the economy
of [the] entire state, the enviable lifestyle ... , and the health of [the] consumers." Id.
52. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2209-10, 2221. The pricing scheme aimed to protect the
Massachusetts' dairy industry, to preserve the corresponding land, and to maintain a relia-
ble in-state source of milk. Id. Aside from the protectionist purpose, the pricing scheme
represented a method of incorporating the costs of the external benefits of dairy farming
into the price of milk. See id. at 2221 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It appears that the
Massachusetts legislature made the value judgment that the cost of the public good of
undeveloped land should be incorporated into the price of milk. See id. (quoting appel-
lee's brief on the public benefits sustained by the dairy industry); cf Kurt Klappholz, Value
Judgments and Economics in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 276, 284 (Daniel M. Haus-
man ed., 1984) (writing that policymakers usually have more than one goal to achieve with
a particular policy). By compensating dairy farmers for their production of a public good,
a state theoretically may produce the optimum level of that good. See SAMUELSON AND
NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 310-13 (discussing methods of internalizing the costs of exter-
nal costs and benefits).
53. Healy I, 611 N.E.2d at 241; see Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13 (finding that the
Massachusetts pricing scheme violated the Commerce Clause because, in effect, it violated
the principle of comparative advantage).
The economic law of comparative advantage holds that goods should be produced only
by states that produce them at relatively low costs. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS,
supra note 1, at 29. Arguably, the pricing scheme did not violate the law of comparative
advantage if the external benefits produced by the dairy industry are taken into account.
See infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text (discussing the internalization of the exter-
nal benefits of undeveloped land).
54. Healy 1, 611 N.E.2d at 241; see infra notes 235-51 and accompanying text (arguing
that out-of-state dairy farmers lost market share but did not pay the incidence of the Mas-
sachusetts dairy tax).
55. Healy I, 611 N.E.2d at 244.
Catholic University Law Review
held the pricing order and subsidy, finding that its incidental burden on
commerce was outweighed by the local benefits it provided.56
The United States Supreme Court reversed Healy I. 7 The Court
found the Massachusetts pricing order protectionist and violative of the
Commerce Clause in its attempt to elevate milk prices and enhance the
profitability of dairy farming in-state." According to the Court, the pric-
ing order produced the same anti-competitive result as a tariff5 9 because
the in-state subsidy more than offset the tax paid by in-state dairy
farmers.6 °
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, criticized the majority's reason-
ing as overly broad and threatening to the state's traditional police
power.61 He opined that many environmentally-motivated state statutes
would not survive judicial review if subjected to the Healy II majority's
56. Id. at 245; see infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text (contending that not only
did the Massachusetts subsidy compensate dairy farmers for the external benefits they pro-
duced, but also may have improved the efficiency of the in-state dairy market).
57. Healy 1I, 114 S. Ct. at 2218.
58. Id. at 2217-18; see infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text (analyzing the con-
tention that self interested or protectionist motives may encourage legislation that im-
proves the efficiency of the market).
59. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212; see infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the tariff-like economic effects of the Massachusetts pricing scheme; absent the consid-
eration of externalities); cf Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135-36 (discussing the Court's
traditional tolerance of subsidies while cautioning that the difference between subsidies
and tariffs is only one of degree).
60. See Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, states
that the pricing scheme creates a tariff-like barrier because out-of-state products bear the
burden of the tax, while subsidized in-state dairy producers may charge supra-competitive
prices. Id. In other words, Justice Stevens concluded that the tax was placed in effect only
on out-of-state milk. Id.; see infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
tariff-like effects of the Massachusetts pricing order and subsidy).
61. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's
reasoning for going well beyond reasoning used by the Court heretofore to find state stat-
utes violative of the Commerce Clause).
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reasoning.62 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion because
of stare decisis.
63
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the ben-
efits of preserving undeveloped land may have justified the subsidy, and
that Congress, not the Court, should decide whether this pricing plan vio-
lated the Commerce Clause. 64 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court's decision was inconsistent with both the principle of federalism
and the doctrine of separation of powers.65
This Note begins with an analysis of Supreme Court Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. It then, explores the potential effect of the Court's reason-
ing in Healy II on future economic experimentation by the states. This
Note proceeds with a discussion of the economic and historical concerns
that the Court has relied on to define the reach of the Commerce Clause.
Next, this Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Healy II, and its
impact on state subsidies of in-state producers. This Note argues that the
decision in Healy II may thwart beneficial economic experimentation by
states. In particular, this Note suggests that the Court is poorly equipped
to determine whether the internalization of an external cost, achieved
only by protecting an industry from out-of-state competitors who are not
compensated for the external benefits they produce, violates the Com-
merce Clause. This Note concludes that Congress is best able to provide
guidelines for economic experimentation among the states because the
legislative branch is more adequately equipped to determine reasonable
economic policy.
62. Id. at 2219; see infra notes 197-98 (reviewing Justice Scalia's concerns that, under
the majority's reasoning, even certain environmentally conscious packaging restrictions
mandated by state law would be invalidated). Justice Scalia did not cite specific state stat-
utes that he believed were threatened by what he perceived as the majority's myopic focus
on the national economic impact of the state regulations. See id. But the Clover Leaf case,
where the Court upheld a state ban on plastic nonreturnable bottles, can serve as an exam-
ple of the type of state action that Justice Scalia fears is endangered by the Healy H deci-
sion. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981). The ban on
plastic nonreturnable bottles may have been motivated by either environmental concerns
or by local milk producers seeking protection. Id. at 458, 460. In Clover Leaf, the Court
found that the state statute did burden interstate commerce but, only incidentally and, not
in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 472-74. Justice Scalia was concerned that
legitimate environmental legislation may be invalidated under Healy I because of the dis-
proportionate economic impact of such statutory schemes. Healy IH, 114 S. Ct. at 2219.
63. Id. at 2220 (concurring in the opinion because, after 121 years of negative Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, this "would not be a principled point at which to disembark
from the negative-Commerce-Clause train"). Id.
64. Id. at 2221-23 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice contends that Con-
gress has not legislated a pure laissez-faire economy, therefore the Court should not im-
pose one under the negative Commerce Clause. Id.
65. Id. at 2223.
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I. PROTECTING THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DECREASING STATE
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Congress has express Constitutional authority to regulate interstate
commerce.' Under the Supremacy Clause, the courts must invalidate
any inconsistent state statute or regulation.6 7 The courts' role in review-
ing state legislation affecting interstate commerce has expanded, how-
ever, under the judicially created dormant Commerce Clause." This
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause limits each state's power to
adopt regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce, absent
any Supremacy Clause invalidation grounds.69
A. The Rise and Fall of the Direct/Indirect Burden Test
The Court's judicial activism in interpreting the Commerce Clause
stems from its determination that the clause "implicitly limit[s] state au-
thority to interfere with business that transcend[s] state lines.",70 The
Court, however, has upheld the constitutionality of some state regulations
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress exclusive legislative power to
regulate interstate commerce).
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.; see also H.
P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (acknowledging Congress'
exclusive Commerce Clause power and discussing the Court's role under the Commerce
Clause); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1939) (finding that Congress regulates inter-
state commerce and any contrary state regulations must be invalidated by the Court). See
Breker-Cooper, supra note 4, at 895 n.3 (noting Congressional authority to regulate inter-
state commerce is limitless).
68. See generally, Breker-Cooper, supra note 4, at 920-30 (discussing the evolution of
Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
69. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,514, 522-26 (1935) (invalidating
state legislation that had been designed to limit competition between the states even when
the federal government is not regulating the field); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988) (finding that any benefits gained by discriminatory state
legislation were insufficient to overcome the unconstitutional restraint on interstate com-
merce the statute imposed).
70. See generally, David P. Currie, THE CONsTrrUmoN IN THE SUPREME COURT 31
(1990) (discussing the expansive reach and the few limitations of the Commerce Clause);
see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239 (1824) (ruling that states cannot
exercise police power to "restrain a free intercourse among the states"); Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851) (deciding that when commercial matters are of national
interest, a state may not individually regulate that field).
Specifically, the Court has found that intrastate sales of milk affect interstate commerce.
See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120 (1942). In Wrightwood
Dairy Co., the Court concluded that "the marketing of a local product in competition with
that of a like commodity moving interstate may so interfere with interstate commerce or its
regulation as to afford a basis for Congressional regulation of the intrastate activity." Id.
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interfering with commerce that transcends state lines under the following
two-tiered test.7' First, when a statute directly effects interstate com-
merce, the Court traditionally has struck it down72 and second, when the
statute only indirectly affects interstate commerce and regulates even-
handedly, the Court balances the statute's burden on interstate com-
merce against the local benefits of the statute.73 Interstate commerce
may be adversely affected by laws made pursuant to a state's Tenth
Amendment74 police power.75 Under the negative Commerce Clause,
the Court must often consider the legitimate interest of the state in pro-
tecting its citizens' health,76 safety,77 and welfare.78
71. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934) (refusing to invalidate a
regulation that was designed to protect the public health by maintaining a fresh and contin-
uous supply of milk even though it burdened interstate commerce); Milk Control Bd. v.
Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 349, 353 (1939) (holding that nondiscriminatory state
dairy regulations designed to protect in-state economic interests, and which only inciden-
tally burdened interstate commerce, did not violate the Commerce Clause).
72. Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,579 (1985) (stat-
ing that the Court generally invalidates discriminatory legislation that directly regulates
interstate commerce). See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding
that New Jersey's ban on importing solid waste from outside the state violated the Com-
merce Clause); Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974) (holding that Mis-
sissippi's failure to "honor and enforce contracts made for interstate or foreign commerce"
violated the Commerce Clause); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 203 (1925)
(invalidating a North Dakota act requiring the comprehensive regulation and grading of
wheat, because it was a direct regulation of interstate commerce).
73. Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579. The Court recognized that an interstate
business may be required to pay taxes as it travels through a state. New York, L. E. & W.
R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1895). The Court stated that "[tihe interfer-
ence with the commercial power must be direct, and not the mere incidental effect of the
requirement of the usual proportional contribution to public maintenance." Id. at 439.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. The Commerce Clause is not an
absolute limit on a state's regulation of matters under its general police powers. See Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36
(1980).
75. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587,593-95 (1928) (discuss-
ing the extent to which a state may burden interstate commerce to eliminate child labor
pursuant to their police power); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 308 (1896) (uphold-
ing a statute regulating the operation of trains on Sunday). Justice Harlan stated that an
exercise of police power that "does not go beyond the necessities of the case" would be
valid until displaced by congressional action. Id.
76. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-51 (1986) (upholding a state statute that
banned out-of-state live baitfish that might introduce new parasites into Maine's fisheries).
77. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (acknowledging
the states' broad power to protect their citizens' safety).
78. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934) (stating that "the power to promote
the general welfare is inherent in government"); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 493 (1887) (noting that a state may ban intrastate commerce of liquor
"[f]or the purpose of protecting its people against the evils of intemperance"); see Baldwin
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The Court's analysis of commercial barriers, however, does not always
fit neatly under the two-tiered test.79 For example, in Nebbia v. New
York,"° the Court upheld a New York statute establishing minimum milk
prices under the theory that milk was a good affected with the public
interest.81 More importantly, the Court refused to hold that the public
control of prices or rates is per se unconstitutional.82 The dissent argued,
however, that price fixing of goods affected with the public interest would
subject the economy to needless regulation.83
1. The Decline of the Direct/Indirect Burden Test
The Supreme Court jettisoned the direct/indirect burden test in Bald-
win v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. ,' when it invalidated a regulatory requirement
that all milk purchased by in-state milk dealers be purchased at or above
a set minimum price.85 The regulatory scheme insulated New York dairy
farmers from out-of-state competitors, compelling the Court to strike
down the statute as protectionist.8 6 In addition, the Court reasoned that
distinctions between indirect and direct burdens on interstate commerce
v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935). Justice Cardozo argued that the citi-
zens' economic welfare could not be invoked to validate a protectionist measure even if
economic welfare is linked to the citizens' health. Id.
79. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 516-18, 538-39 (1934) (upholding a price floor on milk
because milk is important to the public interest).
80. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
81. Id. at 516. An industry affected with a public interest is an enterprise that either
the public itself may conduct, that the owner must obtain a public grant or franchise for, or
that is a monopoly. Id. at 531. The Court upheld the Nebbia statute because it was made
pursuant to the state's police powers. Id. The Court stated:
Milk is an essential item of the diet. It cannot long be stored. It is an excellent
medium for the growth of bacteria. These facts necessitate safeguards in its pro-
duction and handling for human consumption which greatly increase the cost of
the business. Failure of producers to receive a reasonable return for their labor
and investment over an extended period threaten a relaxation of vigilance against
contamination.
Id. at 516-17.
82. Id. at 531-32 (finding that the regulation of prices, like the regulation of the manu-
facturing process, is not necessarily unconstitutional). An industry that maintains a strong
public interest may constitutionally be subject to price regulations. Id.
83. Id. at 555 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (contending that the price regulation of
industries affected with the public interest would lead to numerous price regulations sepa-
rating industry from market forces and ending "liberty under the Constitution").
84. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
85. Id. at 519.
86. Id. at 522. The Court found that the Constitution "was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Id. at 523.
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become irrelevant 7 when the barrier's purpose is to protect in-state mar-
kets from out-of-state producers.8 8 The Court further reasoned that bar-
riers designed to obviate the competitive advantages of out-of-state
producers violated the Commerce Clause. 9
Baldwin, the New York Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, un-
successfully had argued that the legitimate end of protecting the public
health justified the regulatory scheme. 9° The Court reduced Baldwin's
argument to absurdity,91 stating that "[e]conomic welfare is always re-
lated to health, for there can be no health if men are starving." 92 Thus,
the Court indicated that legislative protection of an industry will always
indirectly benefit the health of its employees and their families.9 3 An ex-
ception on health grounds would frustrate the purpose of the Commerce
Clause.
2. Violating the Court's Legislative Will
The Court extended the reach of the negative Commerce Clause by
balancing a state's legitimate interests in regulating against the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce.94 This, though, should be a legislative
87. Id. at 522-23; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). The Court
found the indirect/direct burden test insufficient. Id. "Once an economic measure of the
reach of the power granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of
federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be 'produc-
tion,' nor can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indi-
rect.'" Id.
88. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 526.
89. Id. at 527.
90. Id. at 522. The commissioner argued that the end of the regulatory scheme was
"the maintenance of a regular and adequate supply of pure and wholesome milk .... Id.
at 523.
91. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICIONARY 1514 (2nd ed. 1983).
"Reductio ad absurdum" is defined as "the disproof of a proposition by showing its conse-
quences to be impossible or absurd when it is carried to its logical conclusion." Id. Justify-
ing economic protectionism for some industries but not others, for health reasons, is
absurd because the consumption of goods to maintain one's health is clearly dependent on
the economy. See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
92. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
93. Id. Any protectionist legislation will be beneficial to the health of the state's resi-
dents because that industry's workers may us6 their paychecks to maintain their own and
their families health. It.
94. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977) (accommodating or balancing the national interests in an unobstructed market
against the state's interest in regulating the labeling of apples); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (balancing the burdens for an in-state producer to build a packag-
ing facility, against the state's interest in labeling all cantaloupes as grown in-state); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, at 529 (1959). Although found to be nondiscrimina-
tory, a state law that required rear, contoured-fender, mud guards violated the Commerce
Clause because it unconstitutionally burdened commerce. Id.
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function.95 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,' concerned an Arizona law that
required all cantaloupes grown in-state to be labeled accordingly. 97 The
Arizona agricultural supervisor forbade an in-state cantaloupe grower
from sending his cantaloupes to a California packaging facility to be
packaged and labeled as California cantaloupes.9 Unless the farmer sent
his cantaloupes to California, though, he would have had to build a
$200,000 packaging facility in Arizona. 9 The Court balanced the state's
interest in labeling in-state cantaloupes against the plaintiff's burden of
building a packaging facility."°° The Court invalidated the statute be-
cause the farmer's interest in not building a packaging facility was
stronger than the state's interest in labeling cantaloupes. 10 1 Underlying
the Pike test, is the judicial determination that it is constitutionally per-
missible for the Court to decide Commerce Clause cases by utilizing a
legislative tool.0 2
B. Protecting and Preserving the Competitive Balance Between In-State
and Out-of-State Entities
Under the Commerce Clause, the Court will strike down state legisla-
tion designed to reduce the competitive advantages of out-of-state enti-
ties. 10 3  For example, in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
95. See Eule, supra note 6, at 436 (arguing that the national commercial market should
be regulated by Congress); see also Choper, supra note 22, at 1585-86 (contending that
Congress, not the courts, should regulate commerce because balancing national and state
concerns is a legislative function; and if the job is too burdensome then Congress should
create an agency to regulate commerce).
96. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
97. Id. at 144.
98. Id. at 139.
99. 1l The cantaloupe grower faced losing a $700,000 cantaloupe crop if forced to
spend several months building a $200,000 packaging facility prior to receiving injunctive
relief. Id.
100. Id. at 142. The Court developed the following test for negative Commerce Clause
cases:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be toler-
ated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 142; see McGinley, supra note 12, at 454. Professor McGinley states that
"[t]he Court should, but is unlikely to, declare itself unwilling to continue its practice of
judicially regulating commerce." Id.
103. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)
(invalidating a ban on all state grading labels of apples).
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Commission the Court invalidated a facially neutral North Carolina stat-
ute requiring all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed con-
tainers to be labeled with either the applicable federal grade or no grade
at all.' The Court found that the statute had a discriminatory impact on
the Washington apple industry because "the [North Carolina] statute has
the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the com-
petitive and economic advantages it earned for itself through its expen-
sive inspection and grading system."' 5 The statute did not survive
judicial scrutiny because it shielded the North Carolina apple industry
from out-of-state competitors.' 6
Similarly, states are not permitted to advantage in-state entities
through taxes that only impact out-of-state competitors. 7 A state, none-
theless, may tax an in-state transaction even if the products are destined
for use outside of the state.'08 For example, the Supreme Court upheld
taxes on gross receipts from interstate transactions that occurred within
the borders of the taxing state, provided the tax applied equally to all
"wholly local transactions."'0 9 The Court in International Harvester Co.
v. Department of Treasury," ° held that local transactions may be taxed so
long as the taxable "event is separate and distinct from the transportation
or intercourse which is interstate commerce.""' The underlying policy of
insuring that local industry would not suffer a competitive disadvantage
motivated the Court."' The Court concluded that an in-state users tax as
opposed to a gross receipts tax, would be constitutionally permissible."'
The Court will, however, strike down a state statute that imposes a
discriminatory tax on out-of-state industries." 4 For example, exemptions
from a twenty percent wholesale tax on liquor of certain alcoholic bever-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 351.
106. Id.
107. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a liquor tax
that exempted a liquor developed from a root indigenous to Hawaii).
108. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 342-43, 348
(1944).
109. Id. at 349 (holding that a state may tax certain activities of corporations that do
business in-state but are incorporated out-of-state). It is constitutional for Indiana to tax
interstate transactions that are consummated in Indiana where wholly local transactions
are taxed in the same manner. Id.
110. 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
111. Id. at 346. The Court will validate schemes that tax interstate commerce; so long
as the scheme does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id.
112. Id. at 349. A taxing scheme that exempted interstate commerce invariably would
discriminate against intrastate commerce and vice versa. Id.
113. Id at 348.
114. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
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ages peculiar to Hawaii violated the Commerce Clause." 5 The Court's
decision reversed the Hawaii Supreme Court's holding that the liquor tax
exemption did not violate the Commerce Clause because the incidence of
the tax fell on in-state wholesalers of liquor and ultimately passed onto
in-state consumers. 16 The Supreme Court, in accordance with Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Commission,"' held that the exemption
was constitutionally impermissible because it had the discriminatory pur-
pose of encouraging domestic industry at the expense of interstate
commerce.
18
C. State Police Power and the Interests of the State Resident
The creation of an economic union based on fair trade invariably will
benefit consumers." 9 In H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond,2 ° the
Court extolled the benefits of the Commerce Clause as a means of pro-
tecting the consumer from exploitation by regional producers. 12  Simi-
larly, the Court has permitted certain state barriers to interstate
commerce when the state acted, pursuant to its police power, to protect
consumers.' 22 For example, the Court allowed a state ban of colored ole-
omargarine designed to protect consumers from accidentally purchasing
115. Id.
116. Matter of Bacchus Imports, 656 P.2d 724, 734 (Haw. 1982). The court distin-
guished Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) where Louisiana placed a tax on natu-
ral gas, brought into Louisiana even though much of the gas would be consumed by out-of-
state consumers. Id. The Bacchus court noted that only in-state consumers paid the Ha-
waii liquor tax. Id.
117. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
118. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271.
119. See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that
New York may not ban additional facilities that acquire and ship milk interstate); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia 262 U.S. 553, 597-98 (1923) (invalidating as a serious burden on
interstate commerce and consumers a statute requiring domestic natural gas demands be
met before natural gas could be sold to another state); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) (invalidating a state statute banning the sale to out-of-state
consumers of shrimp captured in Louisiana that had not had their heads and hulls re-
moved). See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 770-74 (discussing the economic benefits of free
trade to consumers).
120. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
121. Id. at 539. Protecting consumers from higher milk prices may not be of much
concern to the federal government. See Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The
Social Cost of Government Regulation of Milk, 21 J. L. & ECON. 33 (1978) (analyzing an
econometric study that showed the cost of government price-support programs to consum-
ers); see James K. Glassman, Sitting on Both Sides of the Fence on Farm Subsidies, WASH.
POST, January 25, 1995, at F1, F4 (discussing the upcoming Congressional battle over farm
subsidies).
122. See Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 479 (1894) (upholding a statute ban-
ning colored oleomargarine in order to prevent consumers from being deceived into be-
lieving it was butter).
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the deceptively-colored margarine instead of butter. 23 Consumers there-
fore benefit from the Court's prohibition against protectionism,'24 as well
as the Court's respect for the States' police powers which legitimately
protect consumer health and safety. 25
1. Trade Barriers for the Public Good
Barriers to interstate trade generally are inefficient because they may
divert production from low cost, out-of-state producers to high cost, in-
state producers.' 26 Some barriers to interstate trade, however, are
123. Id. Arguably, the state was not trying to protect consumers, but rather the in-state
dairy industry. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 279-83
(1980). Producers have strong economic incentives to lobby for protectionist legislation
for their individual products or services. Id. at 280-83. Consumers' interests in defeating
protectionist legislation for an individual product or service is minimal. Id. at 281-83. For
example, protectionist legislation of the merchant marine cost consumers over $600 million
in 1979. Id. at 281. The legislation only costs individual consumers an extra three dollars
per year, but a merchant marine's job may be dependent on such legislation. Id. The
consumer had a $3 incentive to lobby against the legislation while the merchant marine's
financial incentive was much greater. Id. Likewise, individual Massachusetts consumers
probably were not outraged enough by imitation butter to lobby for a ban on colored
oleomargarine. See id. at 280-83 (discussing the economic incentives for lobbying).
124. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 781-82. Consumers benefit when discriminatory
taxes or other trade barriers which drive up the price of commodities are invalidated. Id.
Consumers lose more than domestic producers gain when the government prohibits im-
ports. Id. (discussing the economic gains of producers and losses of consumers when ex-
ports are prohibited). See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984)
(holding that a discriminatory liquor tax, whose incidence arguably fell on in-state consum-
ers, violated the Commerce Clause because the tax disproportionately affected the demand
of in-state and out-of-state liquors); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S.
361, 376-77 (1964) (holding that a Florida statute violated the Commerce Clause because it
created a barrier that neutralized the advantages of out-of-state milk before it entered the
consumer market).
125. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43 (1980) (finding that out-
of-state goods that are particularly likely to threaten the health or safety of a state's citi-
zens may be kept out of a state); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152 (1902) (upholding a
state ban on the importation of diseased livestock); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 480
(1888) (upholding state review and licensing of interstate railway engineers); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852) (validating a state law that required out-of-state
ships to hire a local pilot to help navigate through local waters).
126. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 664. Tariffs are inefficient be-
cause they shift production contrary to the principal of comparative advantage. Id.; see
ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 765. The principal of comparative advantage holds that states
should produce goods in which they have a lower opportunity cost. Id.; see FRIEDMAN,
supra note 123, at 36-37. Professor Friedman illustrates the principle of comparative ad-
vantage by comparing the production of a lawyer to a secretary. Id. To further illustrate
Professor Friedman's example, assume that the attorney earns $75,000 a year and is twice
as productive a secretary and five times as productive an attorney as her secretary who
earns $25,000 a year. See id. The law of comparative advantage would conclude that they
both are better off performing their respective jobs. See id. The lawyer should remain a
lawyer because the opportunity cost of the legal work ($75,000) is higher than the benefits
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designed to internalize the external costs that society is forced to bear. 127
For example, in Bacchus, a tax on wholesale liquor was designed to inter-
nalize the increased costs of "police and other governmental services"
associated with the consumption of liquor.128 The tax was facially dis-
criminatory against out-of-state liquor producers, however, and thus, vio-
lated the Commerce Clause.' 29
A Minnesota ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers did not vio-
late the Commerce Clause because it was facially nondiscriminatory.
1 30
The nondiscriminatory statute which did not apply to paper milk contain-
ers benefitted the in-state paper container manufacturers and burdened
the out-of-state plastics industry.' 3' The burden, however, was not
clearly excessive in comparison to the legitimate state interests in con-
serving natural resources and remedying its waste disposal problems.
132
of her secretarial work (2 X $25,000 = $50,000). See id. Likewise, the opportunity cost for
the secretary of the secretarial work ($25,000) is higher than the benefits of his legal work
($75,000/5 = $15,000). See id.; see also ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 781 (discussing steel
tariffs which saved numerous jobs paying $24,329 but cost domestic consumers an extra
$85,272 for every job saved); see Regan, supra note 3, at 1115 (stating that tariffs interfere
with the efficient production of goods).
127. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1115-16. Barriers to environmentally unfriendly pack-
aging discourages the production of external costs (litter), possibly without decreasing the
efficiency of the markets. Id.; see ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 774 (contending that some
trade barriers may successfully internalize the costs of the external benefits of national
security).
128. Bacchus v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984).
129. Id. The legislature provided the exemption for the local liquor to promote a
fledgling industry. Id. at 270. The "infant-industry" argument states that young industries
need temporary protection until they are mature enough to compete with established out-
of-state industries. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 774.
130. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 456-66 (1981). Respon-
dents offered evidence that the Act would have negative environmental consequences. Id.
The Court reasoned that "[s]tates are not required to convince the courts of the correctness
of their legislative judgments. Rather, 'those challenging the legislative judgment must
convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.' " Id. at
464 (citations omitted). Clover Leaf Creamery had been unable to meet this burden, de-
spite providing substantial evidence that the ban on plastic nonreturnable bottles may have
been worse for the environment than no ban at all. Id. at 463-64.
131. Id. at 458, 473. The respondents argued that the purpose of the Act was to reduce
the interstate competition from plastic container producers, thereby aiding the in-state
pulpwood industries which would benefit from both the ban and the subsequent increase in
use of paper milk containers. Id. The Court acknowledged that the in-state pulpwood
industry would benefit from the legislation, but deemed the burden on interstate com-
merce not to be "clearly excessive" in comparison to the state's legitimate environmental
interests. Id. at 473.
132. Id. at 465-66.
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2. Limiting the States Power with the Negative Commerce Clause
The Court has invalidated statutes, made pursuant to a state's police
power, that facially discriminated against or unduly burdened interstate
commerce.' 33 In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,"3 the Court re-
stricted environmental legislation by invalidating a New Jersey statute
that prohibited the importation of most out-of-state waste. 13 5 The Court
articulated a two-tiered test to determine whether the provision violated
the Commerce Clause.' 36 First, if the statute is facially discriminatory by
protecting in-state entities at the expense of out-of-state entities, the stat-
ute is per se invalid. 37 Second, if the statute is facially neutral, the Court
will balance the statute's incidental burdens on interstate commerce
against the local benefits it provides.' 38 In Philadelphia, the Court found
the statute invalid under the first tier of the test, reasoning that blocking
the flow of waste into the state was one of the clearest examples of eco-
nomic protectionism. 139 The Court struck down the statute because New
Jersey discriminated against out-of-state waste that, apart from its origin,
was no different than in-state waste.' 40
Under the negative Commerce Clause, the Court has permitted a state
to discriminate against interstate commerce only if there exists no less
discriminatory means to reach the legitimate end. 4' In Maine v. Tay-
133. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945) (invalidating a state reg-
ulation on the length of trains because it unduly burdened interstate commerce); Kansas
City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914). "The [Court's] deci-
sions also show that a State cannot avoid the operation of [the Commerce Clause] by sim-
ply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police power." Id.; see infra notes 133-140
(discussing the Court's negative. Commerce Clause rule, which limits a state's police
power).
134. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
135. Id. at 628.
136. Id. at 624.
137. Id. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). In Taylor, the Court validated a
facially discriminatory state statute that prohibited the importation of certain baitfish to
protect in-state fish from out-of-state parasites. Id. at 151.
138. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (citing with approval the dormant Commerce Clause
balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); see supra note 100
and accompanying text (discussing the Pike balancing test).
139. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29. The Court found that the absolute ban on out-of-
state waste was unconstitutional because New Jersey placed the burden of preserving its
remaining landfill space solely on out-of-state interests. Id. at 629.
140. Id. at 627. If New Jersey had been able to find a health hazard unique to out-of-
state waste, the ban may have been permissible as a quarantine law. Id. at 628.
141. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). The ban on out-of-state baitfish was
upheld because no method existed to test baitfish for parasites without killing them. Id. at
141-42.
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lor,142 the Court upheld a state ban on certain out-of-state fishing bait.
143
The ban protected the in-state bait industry from out-of-state parasites. 44
The Court concluded that such discriminatory regulations are constitu-
tional if they," 'serve[ ] a legitimate local purpose', and that this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.'
145
The Court found that Maine demonstrated legitimate reasons for discrim-
inating against out-of-state baitfish, apart from their origin.
146
3. State Recourse After an Erroneous Commerce Clause Ruling
Unfortunately the states have insignificant protection from erroneous
Commerce Clause decisions made by the judiciary. 147 The Court, in Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 48 held that state au-
thority under the Commerce Clause is better protected by state
participation in the federal government than by judicial review.149 Pre-
sumably, the states' interests are procedurally protected in the federal
government because they are represented in both houses of Congress.' 50
In fact, the Framers of the Constitution structured Congress to secure the
states from the encroachment of federal power.'
5'
142. 477 U.S. at 131.
143. Id. at 151-52. The Maine statute banned the importation of all live baitfish. Id. at
132-33.
144. Id. at 140-41. The state argued that the delicate eco-system of Maine's lakes could
be disturbed by the introduction of non-native parasites carried by live baitfish. Id. at 141.
145. Id. at 138. Even though live baitfish must be killed to inspect them for parasites, a
statistical sampling method could be developed to certify shipments as parasite-free. Id. at
141-42. No scientifically accepted method of sampling, however, has been developed for
live baitfish. Id.
146. Id. at 140-41. Despite evidence of protectionist motives, the Court found that the
statute did not arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 149, 151.
147. See Redish and Nugent, supra note 10, at 589-90. The negative Commerce Clause
represents a shift in power from Congress to the judiciary due to inactivity by Congress.
Id. Professors Redish and Nugent, however, argue that the Framers intended state com-
mercial regulations to be valid unless preempted by Congress. Id. The negative Com-
merce Clause thus upsets the constitutional balance of power between the States,
Congress, and the Court. Id. at 603.
148. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
149. Id. at 554. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that the Framers
decided to rely on the procedural "restraints on federal power over the States," rather than
express limitations on federal power. Id. at 552.
150. See id. at 568-72 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the states' "major role [in the
Federal System] that cannot be pre-empted by the National Government").
151. Id. at 551 (discussing the Framer's intent to secure state power in the national
government through representation in the legislature); see Tim FEDERALIST No. 58, at 357
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison contended that the United States
Senate is the legislative branch that functions as the representation of the states. Id.; see
Choper, supra note 22, at 1561 (contending that state's rights are protected in the United
States House of Representatives).
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The Court's holding in Garcia indicates that a state's only protection
against the Court under the dormant Commerce Clause is procedural.152
In particular, a state, through its elected representatives, can persuade
Congress to legislate against a court's decision. 53 The likelihood of Con-
gressional intervention in judicial decision-making, however, is not high
due to Congress' demanding workload.' 54
152. See Garcia, 496 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the majority's
decision renders the Tenth Amendment meaningless and that States' sovereignty under the
Commerce Clause may no longer be protected by the Court); James Hinshaw, The Dor-
mant Commerce Clause After Garcia: An Application to the Interstate Commerce of Sani-
tary Landfill Space, 67 IND. L.J. 511, 513 (1992). Garcia held that the Supreme Court will
protect the states from Congress if political processes are not operating effectively. Id. at
513. In addition, the Court recognized that its continued balancing of state sovereignty
interests under the negative Commerce Clause is an exception to its political process the-
ory. Id. at 529; see also H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)
(stating that Congress has the power to overrule the Supreme Court's negative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence). If a state's interest is not properly represented in Congress then an
erroneous negative Commerce Clause decision may not be corrected by the legislature.
See Hinshaw, supra at 529.
153. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1890). In Hardin, the Court found that
the states may seek commercial legislation from Congress. Id. Chief Justice Fuller, writing
for the majority, stated:
[Tihe responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regulation of interstate com-
merce is concerned, to remove the restriction upon the State in dealing with im-
ported articles of trade within its limits, which have not been mingled with the
common mass of property therein, if in its judgment the end to be secured justi-
fies and requires such action.
Id. But see McGinley, supra note 12, at 454 n.170. Professor McGinley discusses the sig-
nificance of shifting Commerce Clause power to the Supreme Court under the negative
Commerce Clause.
While it is perfectly logical for Congress to preempt state laws that unduly burden
commerce, any such legislative decision must inevitably implicate the political
protection afforded states by the structure of the federal government-the voice
of the states heard through their elected representatives and an executive chosen
by a state-influenced electoral college. Under the extant dormant Commerce
Clause approach, state and local interests have no chance to influence the Court
in the political sense because the Court, rather than the Congress, decides
whether to preempt a state law burdening free-trade interests.
Id
154. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390,400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing the sluggishness of government, and the multitude of matters Congress handles).
Justice Jackson discussed the dilemma that Courts face where states burden interstate com-
merce and Congress has not acted:
It is a tempting escape from a difficult question to pass to Congress the responsi-
bility for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions to national com-
merce. But these restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and too
local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters.
It Congress' busy schedule is equally likely to prevent Congress from overruling errone-
ous negative Commerce Clause decisions by the Supreme Court. See Redish and Nugent,
supra note 10, at 590 (quoting Thomas Merrill). Professor Merrill states that Congress is
far more likely not to act than to act. Id. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the dor-
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II. WEST LYNN CREAMERY V. HEALY. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
OF STATE SUBSIDIES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In Healy //,115 the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
tax on all milk sold in-state, that was used to subsidize in-state dairy farm-
ers, violated the Commerce Clause. I56 The Court held that although indi-
vidually the tax and the subsidy may be legal, the combination of the two
in the same pricing scheme was constitutionally impermissible.157 The
Court's decision illustrates its willingness to sacrifice a state's sovereignty
to preserve the Court's concept of an economic union.
158
West Lynn Creamery challenged the pricing scheme under the Com-
merce Clause.159 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
that the pricing scheme did not violate the Commerce Clause because it
was facially nondiscriminatory and only burdened interstate commerce
incidentally. 6 ° The United States Supreme Court reversed the Massa-
chusetts Court in Healy I,161 and by doing so disallowed the dairy farmer
subsidy, funded from a tax on milk dealers of all fluid milk sold in-
state. 62 The Court found that the burden of the tax fell on out-of-state
milk 6 ' because the amount of tax paid by in-state dairy farmers was
mant Commerce Clause thus represents a shift of power to the judiciary, arguably in viola-
tion of the Constitution. Id.
155. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
156. Id. at 2214, n.15.
157. Id. at 2214-15.
158. Id.; see supra notes 3, 11 (discussing the Court's concept of an economic union and
its effect on state commercial power).
159. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 611 N.E.2d 239 (Mass. 1993). In the meantime,
West Lynn Creamery's dairy dealer license was revoked by the Massachusetts Department
of Food and Agriculture because it failed to comply with the milk pricing scheme. Healy
11, 114 S. Ct. at 2210. West Lynn Creamery sought preliminary injunctive relief in the
Superior Court of Suffolk County from the license revocation. Id. The Superior Court
denied the request and West Lynn Creamery appealed the decision to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in a consolidated case with two other dairy dealers. Id.
160. Healy I, 611 N.E.2d at 245.
161. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2205.
162. Id. at 2214.
163. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330, 338 (1923). Justice Van Devanter, writ-
ing for the majority stated that
[a] state can neither tax the act of engaging in interstate commerce nor lay a tax
on gross receipts therefrom. In either case the tax would be a restraint or burden
on such commerce and its imposition an invasion of the power of regulation con-
fided to Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Id. But see Presentation of Milk Inventory Management Program Study Results and Solic-
itation of Comments, 56 Fed. Reg. 22514 (1991) [hereinafter Dairy Study]. A study by a
U.S. Department of Agriculture task force estimates that consumer demand for milk
would decline only 1.5% if the price of milk increased 10%. Id. at 22520; see David L.
Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the Antitrust
Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VrL. L. REv. 183, 206 (1986) (stating that the strong de-
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more than offset by the subsidy.1" The Supreme Court's opinion, how-
ever, places new limitations on a state's ability to economically regulate
in-state industries.
165
A. The Majority Opinion: Preserving the Economic Union
In Healy 11, the Supreme Court held that even though a tax and a sub-
sidy may not individually violate the Commerce Clause, a violation may
occur when the two are used in conjunction. 166 Like the tax in Interna-
tional Harvester v. Department of Treasury,' 67 the tax on a dairy dealer's
in-state milk sales is nondiscriminatory and, as such, may be permissible
under the Commerce Clause.'68 In addition, a state ordinarily may subsi-
dize an in-state producer from its general funds within the confines of the
negative Commerce Clause.' 69 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
Healy II, likened a subsidy, funded from a tax that falls on out-of-state
products, to a tariff. 7 °
In Healy II, the Massachusetts Commissioner of the Department of
Food and Agriculture concluded that the state must preserve its dairy
industry by increasing the price of milk.' 7 ' Shortly after the commis-
mand for milk may be exploited by dairy producers because an increase in price leads to an
increase in revenue); SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 70-71 (discussing the
effect of price increases on revenue where demand is inelastic).
164. Healy 1I, 114 S. Ct. at 2214. The majority analogized Massachusetts' milk pricing
scheme to a discriminatory tax because the tax paid by in-state producers was more than
offset by the subsidy they received back from the Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund.
Id. Because the in-state dairy farmers realized a net gain after the taxes and subsidies were
accounted for, it logically follows that the net gain was funded by taxes paid on out-of-state
milk. See id.
165. See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative nature of
economic policy decisions); see supra notes 11, 21-22 (discussing the relationship between
Congress and the States with respect to commercial power).
166. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2214-15. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority in which
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2208.
167. 322 U.S. 340, 349 (1944) (holding that Indiana's gross receipts tax on interstate
transactions was valid under the Commerce Clause because Indiana treated local transac-
tions similarly).
168. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2214 n.15. The tax is nondiscriminatory because it applies to
all milk sold in-state, whether it had been purchased from in-state or out-of-state produ-
cers. Id. at 2214 n.16.
169. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (stating that subsidies generally do
not violate the Commerce Clause).
170. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2211-12; see infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the economic effects of the Massachusetts milk pricing scheme that led Justice Ste-
vens to conclude that the pricing scheme was a tariff-like barrier).
171. Healy HI, 114 S. Ct. at 2209-10. The production costs for Massachusetts dairy farm-
ers were approximately three dollars higher per hundred pounds of milk than the federal
price floor. Id. The Massachusetts dairy farmers supplied approximately one-third of the
domestic demand for milk. Id. The pricing scheme set the tax equal to one-third of the
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sioner drew these conclusions, the state instituted the pricing scheme. 172
The majority concluded that the overriding purpose of the pricing scheme
was to protect the in-state dairy industry. 173 As such, it violated the
Court's prohibition against state protectionist legislation.'
74
While the majority neither disputed nor accepted the respondents' as-
sertion that because individually both the tax'75 and subsidy are legal, 76
the combination of the two is also legal.' 77 The Court reasoned that the
combination of the two measures is more dangerous to interstate com-
merce than the independent effect of either provision. 178 The Court uti-
lized a process argument, reasoning that the state political process does
not internalize the costs placed on out-of-state dairy farmers and is there-
fore an unreliable indicator of fair state economic legislation.
179
Next, the majority dismissed the respondents' argument that, because
the tax was paid by milk dealers who did not compete against in-state
dairy farmers, the pricing order did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 180 The respondents' reasoning, if accepted, would permit a
sales tax on only out-of-state milk, a premise which clearly would violate
the Commerce Clause. 81 The Court reasoned that the tax would effec-
difference between $15 (approximately the Massachusetts production price) and the fed-
eral blend price. Id. The Commissioner chose this scheme because it generated approxi-
mately enough funds to maintain the state's current domestic dairy production. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2213.
174. Id. Stating that the protection of in-state industry violates the Commerce Clause
"because it, like a tariff, 'neutralize[s] advantages belonging to the place of origin.'" Id.
(citing Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
175. The Court has upheld state taxes that affect interstate commerce. See Wisconsin &
Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903) (finding that interstate firms must bear some
of the burdens of government by paying certain local taxes); Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry.
Co., 142 U.S. 217 (1891) (upholding a gross receipts tax on railroad companies calculated
as a percentage of total receipts, divided by the total number of miles of tracks operated,
multiplied by the total number of miles of in-state tracks).
176. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2214.
177. Id. The respondent contended that because it can constitutionally tax milk distrib-
utors and subsidies are constitutional, it may use the proceeds of the tax as it chooses. Id.
178. Id. at 2215. Justice Stevens analogized the Massachusetts pricing scheme to an
unconstitutional liquor tax which involved Hawaii's constitutional exercise of power to tax
and to grant tax exemptions. Id. (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984)); see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Bacchus liquor tax).
179. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2215 (stating that the political process is unlikely to protect
out-of-state producers because in-state producers are appeased by the subsidy and con-
sumers are unlikely to organize against higher milk prices).
180. Id. at 2216 (dismissing the respondent's argument because the tax and subsidy
scheme placed a heavier burden on out-of-state milk, and thus the differential burden
benefitted in-state producers over out-of-state producers).
181. Id. Justice Stevens concluded that the Massachusetts pricing scheme is no differ-
ent under the Constitution than a discriminatory tax. Id.
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tively be paid by out-of-state products whether the tax was placed on
dealers or producers.'82
The respondents next asserted that the pricing scheme did not violate
the Commerce Clause because the tax burden was placed on both in-state
milk dealers and in-state consumers.' 8 3 The majority dismissed the
respondents' argument under the reasoning set forth in Bacchus."8 In
Bacchus, the Supreme Court dismissed a tax paid by in-state consumers,
that discriminated against out-of-state producers. 85 In addition, the
Court reasoned that out-of-state producers necessarily are hurt by any
pricing scheme designed to divert market share to in-state producers.
8 6
The Healy II majority dismissed the respondents' argument that the
local benefits of preserving the ailing in-state dairy industry and the unde-
veloped tracts of farm land' 87 outweighed any incidental burden on inter-
state commerce. 188 Moreover, the majority attacked the proposition that
subsidizing an ailing industry should be distinguished from improving the
competitive position of a healthy industry. 89 The Court essentially found
182. Id. The majority stated that a discriminatory tax may not escape Commerce
Clause scrutiny because it is effectively placed on the out-of-state product instead of the
out-of-state producer. Id.
183. Id.; see Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 128 (1869) (arguing that the political
process places a check on arbitrary commercial legislation where the legislature can harm
disfavored interests only by harming in-state interests).
184. Woodruff 75 U.S. at 128; see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's reasoning for invalidating a discriminatory state liquor tax).
185. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2216. A discriminatory tax does not survive a Commerce
Clause challenge simply because in-state consumers pay also. Id. (citing Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984)).
186. Id. at 2217 (finding that any program designed to shift market share to in-state
producers necessarily injures out-of-state competitors).
187. See id. at 2217-18. The majority stated that it is not self-evident that the declining
number of dairy farms will lead to less undeveloped land. Id. at 2218. In support of this
argument, the majority cites a Massachusetts research bulletin addressing the issue from
1951-1971. Id. at 2217 n. 20. (citing J. Foster & W. MacConnell, Agricultural Land Use
Change in Massachusetts 1951-1971, p. 5 (Research Bulletin No. 640, Jan. 1977)). The
relevance of this report is questionable because the decline in Massachusetts producers'
share of the market from the 1980's to the early 1990's led to the enactment of the pricing
scheme. Id. at 2209.
188. Dairy Study, 56 Fed. Reg. 22556 (1991). Massachusetts milk production decreased
from 790 million pounds of milk in 1965 to 461 million pounds of milk in 1990. Id. Nation-
ally, milk production increased even though there were fewer dairy farms. Id. This re-
sulted from steadily increasing milk production per cow over the past two decades. Id. at
22516.
189. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2217 (reasoning that "the rule against discrimination" is
designed to subject all industry to interstate competition whether the industry is thriving or
failing).
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a discriminatory purpose, regardless of whether the protected industry is
thriving or failing.1 9°
The Court dismissed the respondents' argument that the pricing
scheme should have been permitted because it preserved undeveloped
land. In support of its decision, the Court cited Philadelphia v. New
Jersey. 9 ' In Philadelphia, the Court ruled that an environmental goal
may not be attained by discriminating against articles of commerce unless
there is a legitimate reason for discriminating against those articles.
192
Justice Stevens stated that an environmentally motivated commercial
statute may not survive solely because of its virtuous goal. 9 3
B. The Concurring Opinion: Drawing the Line on Subsidies
Justice Scalia characterized the majority's reasoning as overly broad,
194
because, in his opinion, it would invalidate any law that "obstructs a na-
tional market."'195 Justice Scalia cautioned that the Court's expansive ra-
tionale would invalidate many existing laws that further local interests
but do not directly burden interstate commerce. 1 96 In particular, Justice
190. Id. The Court's holding is important because it is consistent with the principal of
comparative advantage. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 663 (stating
that relatively high-cost producers should not be producing that good). The reasoning also
appears to prevent states from protecting infant industries that need protection to mature
into competitive industries. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 774.
191. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2217 n.20; see supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text
(discussing Philadelphia v. New Jersey).
192. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). The Court found that the
means New Jersey utilized were constitutionally impermissible regardless of the end de-
sired. Id.
[Ilt does not matter whether the ultimate aim of [the New Jersey regulation] is to
reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open
lands from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its
residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment .... But whatever New
Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from the origin, to treat them differently.
Id.
193. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2217 n.20 (Justice Stevens reached this conclusion due to the
Philadelphia decision).
194. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia interpreted the Court's reasoning
as an amalgamation of all the expansive negative Commerce Clause opinions. Id. at 2219.
This resulted in a principle that invalida tes any state statute or regulation that encourages
production contrary to the law of comparative advantage as applied to the United States.
Id.; see SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 663-64 (discussing the principle of
comparative advantage).
195. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2219 (contending that some laws that interfere with the
national market do not violate the Commerce Clause).
196. Id. (contending that the Massachusetts pricing scheme is no different than states'
attempts to attract industry through subsidies).
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Scalia referred to statutes that favor in-state industry incidentally to ad-
vance the statute's environmental objective. 97 Essentially, he doubted
the wisdom of invalidating state laws that objectively serve both protec-
tionist and environmental goals.198
Justice Scalia implied that he would enforce the "negative Commerce
Clause against state laws that either facially discriminate against inter-
state commerce or that are indistinguishable from laws previously held
unconstitutional by the Court.19 9 Under the second situation, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Massachusetts pricing scheme was analogous to
a discriminatory tax exemption, which the Court invalidated as repugnant
to the Commerce Clause in Bacchus.2 0 Therefore, despite his concerns,
Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion because of the principle of stare
decisis.2° '
In an effort to shape the Court's expansive reasoning, Justice Scalia
advocated a bright line between constitutionally permissible and imper-
missible subsidies.2 °2 He argued that a state should be able to subsidize
an industry "so long as it does so from nondiscriminatory taxes that go
197. Id. Justice Scalia believes that the Court's reasoning endangers some state laws
requiring the use of certain recyclable packaging materials that are contrary to industry
practice. Id Such laws "favor[ ] local non-exporting producers, who do not have to estab-
lish an additional, separate packaging operation for in-state sales." Id.; see supra notes
130-32 and accompanying text (discussing the validation of a state law banning nonrecycl-
able plastic milk containers in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981)).
198. See Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that a law similar to
the Clover Leaf Creamery ban on nonrecyclable plastic milk bottles "would be unconstitu-
tional without regard to whether disruption of the 'national market' is the real purpose of
the restriction, and without the need to 'balance' the importance of the state interests
thereby pursued").
199. Id. at 2220; see Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 259-60 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing the Case of the
State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1852); and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 15-16, 225-28, 230-33
(1824) (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment)). Justice Scalia is critical of the Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, contending that the Court's application of the neg-
ative Commerce Clause "[has,] not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense."
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 260.
200. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2220; see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
(invalidating a discriminatory state liquor tax).
201. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2220 (concurring on the basis of stare decisis because the
Court adopted the negative Commerce Clause 121 years ago in Reading R.R. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania (Case of the State Freight Tax), 82 U.S. 232 (1873)). Id. Justice Scalia concurred
despite, his concerns that there is no textual support for the negative Commerce Clause in
the Constitution. Id. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (finding
that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce,
but also places a limit on the states' power to discriminate against interstate commerce).
202. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia drew the
bright line between subsidies funded from taxes placed in a separate fund and subsidies
funded by taxes placed in the general fund. Id. Justice Scalia drew the line here because
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into the state's general revenue fund. '20 3 This bright line limit of the
negative Commerce Clause had not been based on the assumption that a
consciously funded state subsidy is less likely to be used solely for protec-
tionist purposes.2
C. The Dissenting Opinion: Economic Experimentation
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the tax and subsidy
plan was designed, in part, to preserve a supply of fresh local milk.2 °5
The Chief Justice argued that the Massachusetts pricing scheme should
have been upheld for the same reasons a Pennsylvania statute which re-
quired a minimum price to be paid to in-state dairy farmers,2 °6 was up-
held in Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Product.2°7 The price floor
affected the price out-of-state milk purchasers paid to Pennsylvania dairy
dealers.20 s The Court held that the Pennsylvania statute only burdened
interstate commerce incidentally. 20 9 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that the Massachusetts pricing scheme placed a similar
incidental burden on interstate commerce and, like the Pennsylvania
price floor, did not discriminate with respect to in-state milk dealers.210
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist justified the pricing scheme based
on its environmental objective of preserving undeveloped tracts of land in
the Massachusetts pricing scheme was analogous to the discriminatory taxes held invalid
under the Commerce Clause in Bacchus. Id.
203. Id. at 2221.
204. Id. The Chief Justice stated that interest group participation in the political pro-
cess should not be utilized under negative Commerce Clause analysis, even though protec-
tionist legislation would not be as likely to pass. Id. This is so because the voters would
more likely perceive the opportunity costs of subsidies being paid from the state's general
fund. Id.
205. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Massachusetts provided the subsidy,
in part, to preserve the local supply of milk pursuant to its police powers).
206. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939). The Court
upheld a price floor for milk; finding that it benefitted both dairy consumers and produ-
cers. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 352.
209. Id.
210. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2222 (finding that Massachusetts dairy tax scheme, like the
Eisenberg price floor, was nondiscriminatory because it applied to all milk sold in-state,
regardless of where it had been produced).
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Massachusetts.211 Without assistance from the state government, these
external benefits would disappear, thereby harming the entire state.212
The dissent concluded that it was a legislative decision whether the
Massachusetts tax and subsidy plan violated the Commerce Clause.213
Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that economic experimentation should
not be thwarted by the courts, but only, if at all, by Congress.214 In his
opinion a policy of laissez-faire economics 215 is not in the Constitution,
and if it is to be implemented it must be implemented by Congress, not
the courts.216 The Chief Justice asserted that economic experimentation
is a value of federalism that the judicially imposed negative Commerce
Clause threatens.217
211. Id. at 2221. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that preserving undeveloped land
via a subsidy did not violate the Commerce Clause because "[n]o one disputes that a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and effect of encourag-
ing domestic industry." Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271
(1984).
212. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that not only will Massachusetts risk losing in-
state dairy farmers, but that the state also will lose "the open lands that are used as wildlife
refuges, for recreation, hunting, fishing, tourism, and education." Id. (quoting the Massa-
chusetts Special Commission).
213. Id. at 2223 (contending that economic policy decisions should be left with the
elected representatives of the people as required by the principles of federalism).
214. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Justice Brandeis in support of his contention that
economic policy should be determined by Congress, and if Congress chooses not to legis-
late then the Constitution requires that the power rest with the states. Id.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)).
215. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 35. In a laissez-faire system, the
government interferes with the economy only when absolutely necessary. Id. In such an
economy the market place is relied on to reach efficient outcomes. Id.; see Regan, supra
note 3, at 1096-97 (warning that a failure to understand the difference between laissez-faire
economics and free trade could result in the invalidation of nonprotectionist state legisla-
tion under the negative Commerce Clause).
216. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2223. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that a policy of laissez-
faire economics under the principles of federalism must be made by Congress. Id.; see
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 285,360 (Richard B. Morris
ed. 1957) (discussing Alexander Hamilton's arguments for government support of industry
instead of a laissez-faire approach).
217. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2223. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that under federalist
principles, the states should be able to regulate their economies unless Congress provides
otherwise. Id.; see infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing the beneficial infor-
mation produced by states engaging in economic experimentation).
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III. WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE ON TAXES AND SUBSIDIES
Healy II is an important case in the evolution of the American econ-
omy. Under traditional economic analysis, 18 which does not necessarily
account for external costs and benefits,219 the Massachusetts pricing
scheme suffers from the economic inefficiencies of a tariff.2 2 ° If the exter-
nal benefits of undeveloped land are factored into the equation, however,
the pricing scheme looks less like a tariff and more like a solution.22 '
States that are willing to risk economic experimentation provide benefi-
cial information for Congress. Such experimentation enables Congress to
determine whether the state program should be implemented federally or
legislated against.222 Unfortunately, the Court's decision in Healy II
thwarts economic experimentation at the state level.
There is no textual support in the Constitution for Court action based
on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.223 In fact, there
218. In this Note, I equate traditional economics to classical economics. See ARNOLD,
supra note 35, at 220 (stating that classical economists advocated an economic policy of
laissez-faire, because they believed that the market mechanism can be relied on to reach
efficient outcomes); see Steven Kelman, Regulation and Paternalism, PUBLIC POLICY 29
(1981) reprinted in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, 151, 156 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Nor-
man E. Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988) (contending that "introductory economics textbooks tend
to obscure the issue [of externalities], because they imply that most actions lack external
effects").
219. See generally SAMUELSON AND NORDHtAUS, supra note 1, at 311-12 (discussing the
differences between public and private goods). Externalities are external costs or benefits
that the market does not account for when reaching equilibrium. Id.
220. See infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text (discussing the similar economic
effects of a tariff and the Massachusetts pricing scheme). Classical economic theory holds
that the market is self regulating and thus reaches efficient outcomes on its own. See SAM-
UELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 376. A market that involves external costs and
benefits will not reach an efficient outcome on its own. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at
723-24 (analyzing government interference in the market designed to adjust production to
its socially optimal level). The Massachusetts commissioner purported that the pricing
scheme produced local benefits outweighing the burden it placed on interstate commerce.
See Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2217. In economic terms the commissioner is claiming that the
Massachusetts pricing scheme produced a more efficient market by internalizing the costs
of external benefits. Id.; see ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 723-24 (discussing the use of taxes
and subsidies to help the market achieve a more efficient outcome).
221. See infra notes 287-306 and accompanying text (exploring the possibility of reach-
ing the socially optimal level of undeveloped dairy land under the Massachusetts pricing
scheme).
222. See Redish and Nugent, supra note 10, at 598 (extolling the benefits of state eco-
nomic experimentation). Professors Redish and Nugent contend that the text of the Con-
stitution provides for the benefits of state economic experimentation, while retaining for
Congress the power to preempt state commercial regulations that unduly burden interstate
commerce. Id.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Constitution grants all of the power to regulate
commerce to Congress. Id.; see infra note 10 (discussing the tension between the Constitu-
tion and the negative Commerce Clause).
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are compelling reasons to leave the Commerce Clause power with Con-
gress - where the Constitution placed it.224 Congress is adept at gather-
ing information, while the courts generally are limited to the information
presented by both parties.225 Healy 11226 clearly demonstrates that such
policy-making decisions should rest with Congress.227 The lengthy and
subjective analysis of the Massachusetts' pricing scheme calls into ques-
tion the appropriateness of a court deciding such commercial issues.228
Healy II's analytical structure highlights why economists rarely agree on
economic policy decisions that are crucial to a society's quality of life.229
224. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequate proce-
dural protections states receive from judicial negative Commerce Clause decisions with
which Congress may disagree); see supra note 12 (contending that an economic policy is-
sued by Congress would be more efficient than having the Court invalidate particular state
statutes and regulations under the negative Commerce Clause); see supra note 13 (arguing
that commercial policy should be determined by Congress because it, unlike the Court, is
restrained by the will of the people); see infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Congress' superior ability to gather relevant information necessary to make eco-
nomic policy judgments).
225. THE FEDERALIST No. 56, 346-47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that commercial regulation requires significant information and that the legislature
is designed to gather such information); see infra note 227 (arguing that economic policy-
making requires the gathering of information and that Congress, not the Court, is best
suited for this purpose).
226. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
227. Id. at 2217. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority stated that if the Court were
to accept that local benefits justified the Massachusetts pricing scheme, "we would make a
virtue of the vice that the [Commerce Clause] condemns." Id.; see GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS, 4 (1982) (stating that there is hardly
anything in economics except for policy); see GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE POLITICAL ELEMENT
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1954), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ECONOMICS 250, 254 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 1984) (contending that economists fre-
quently mask the value judgments that form the basis of their economic views). "In texts
where economic policy is discussed in practical terms adapted to concrete problems, we
usually find that the elements of specific political doctrines are introduced as simple asser-
tions, without the paraphernalia of proof which the writers concerned undoubtedly feel
they could easily supply if required." Id. at 254-55. See generally WOGAMAN, supra note
28, at 155-66. (maintaining that economics is not a hard science that may be applied
mechanically, rather, economics must be based on certain value judgments); see Breker-
Cooper, supra note 4, at 899-902 (discussing that the Constitution vests the fact finding
process necessary for Commerce Clause determinations with Congress).
228. See MYRDAL, supra note 227, at 257-58. The author stated that the first premise of
economics is the meaning of value. Id. He added that this determination may only be
made in the realm of politics and philosophy. Id.
229. See SILK, supra note 26, at 25-48 (arguing that economists disagree frequently be-
cause their theories are biased by their own political and social values). For example, econ-
omist Joan Robinson considered the market economy to be unstable, and "subject to the
problems of income inequality, manipulation of demand, and extreme business concentra-
tion." ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 568. Professor George Akerlof argued that it is advanta-
geous to pay labor more than the market dictates because worker productivity will rise. Id.
at 348. Professor Murray Rothbard contends that the government should not interfere
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Fortunately, the Framers of the Constitution empowered Congress, not
the courts to determine economic policy.23°
A. The Economics of the Massachusetts Pricing Scheme
The majority in Healy II noted that the Court "[has] never squarely
confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so
now." 231 The general rule, though, is that subsidizing an in-state industry
does not violate the Constitution.232 Additionally, the Court has held
that both a discriminatory tax credit 233 and a discriminatory tax are con-
stitutionally invalid.234
The Court concluded that the tax predominately fell on out-of-state
products and thus, impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. 235 This
determination is crucial because the Court is more likely to uphold a reg-
ulation that adversely affects major in-state interests; while the legislature
is more likely to address a legitimate in-state interest.236 The incidence of
a tax on a dealer may be partially or fully shifted backwards to the produ-
with the market economy. Id. at 861-62. Murray Weidenbaum, former chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, advocates government involve-
ment in environmental issues where large externalities are present. Id. at 728. Karl Marx
believed that capitalism would lead to severe economic downturns, which in turn would
lead to the ruling class' further exploitation of workers, until the workers revolted. Id. at
866. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith advocates government mandated income redistri-
bution programs. Id. at 694. Economist Milton Friedman contends that the government
should not interfere with the market. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 8-9.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 266-69 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the grant of commercial power to Congress); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 16 (1824) (stating "that all those high exercises of power, which might be con-
sidered as giving the rule, or establishing the [economic] system, in regard to great com-
mercial interests, were necessarily left with Congress alone"); see ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE CONTINENTALIST, No. 5. N.Y. Packet, (Apr. 18, 1782) reprinted in RICH-
ARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 358 (1957)
(arguing that "vesting Congress with the power of regulating trade ought to have been a
principal object of the Confederation" because Congress can make informed decisions
designed to "preserve the balance of trade in favor of [the] nation").
231. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994).
232. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988) (reasoning that direct
subsidization of an in-state industry generally does not violate the Commerce Clause but
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does).
233. Id. at 271-80 (finding invalid an Ohio statute that allowed for a discriminatory tax
credit).
234. See Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984) (finding that Hawaii's
alcohol tax was protectionist and therefore discriminatory and unconstitutional).
235. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212 (finding that the Massachusetts dairy tax was effec-
tively imposed only on out-of-state milk).
236. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981) (argu-
ing that "[t]he existence of a major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a
powerful safeguard against legislative abuse") (citing South Carolina State Highway Dept.
v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938)); International Harvester Co. v. Depart-
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cers or forward to the consumers.237 In fact, whether a tax was collected
from milk consumers or from milk dealers, the impact of the tax theoreti-
cally would not change.238 With the exception of controlled economic
experiments, however, it is very difficult to measure the effects of taxes as
they pass through the economy.239 Congress is better equipped than the
Courts, though, to determine the incidence of a tax.240
A cursory examination of the factors that determine where the inci-
dence of a tax lies suggests that the incidence of the Massachusetts dairy
tax fell predominately on consumers. 241 The incidence of a tax is deter-
ment of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1944) (upholding a tax treating identically inter-
state and intrastate transactions consummated in-state).
237. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 333 (discussing the incidence of
taxes). In analyzing a tax, one must first ask who ultimately pays the tax. See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 606 (3rd ed. 1986). Judge Posner has
stated that:
[I]t is irrelevant from an economic standpoint whether a tax is 'on' interstate com-
merce or where the nominal subject of the tax is physically located. The eco-
nomic issues are how much of the tax is ultimately borne by nonresidents and
whether the effect of the tax is to increase, without justification based on higher
costs of governmental services, the prices of imported compared to domestic
goods.
Id.
238. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 319 (1989).
The incidence of a tax is contingent solely on the shape and elasticities of the supply and
demand curves and not where the tax is collected. Id. A tax will fall on consumers and
producers in different proportions, depending on the relative elasticities of supply and de-
mand. SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 75. If demand is relatively inelastic
compared to supply, then the tax burden falls heavily on consumers. Id. A tax, however,
will fall predominately on producers, if supply is relatively more inelastic then demand. Id.
239. See SAMUELSON AND NORDnAUS, supra note 1, at 333 (discussing the economic
concept of tax incidence). For example, a tax placed on gas stations, calculated as a per-
centage of total gasoline sales, will not be paid solely by the gas station, it may be partially
passed to consumers. Id. Part of the incidence of the tax may be placed on truck-drivers.
See id. The truck-drivers in turn may push part of the incidence of the tax on to their
employers. See id. The employers then may place part of the incidence back on the con-
sumers of the products which were shipped by the truck driver of the gasoline. See id.
240. See Redish and Nugent, supra note 10, at 594 (stating that Congress has both supe-
rior access to information, and the ability to distribute problems to agencies who may then
hold hearings and debate the issues); see also Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Feder-
alism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 84
(1980) (contending that "Congress has the superior institutional capability to gather rele-
vant economic information, and Congress operates on the political basis considered most
appropriate for resolving normative questions").
241. See infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text (analyzing the incidence of the Mas-
sachusetts dairy tax).
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mined by the price elasticities of supply242 and demand.243 An inelastic
supply and an inelastic demand results in the burden of the tax falling
mainly on consumers. 24 Milk, for instance, is likely to have a fairly in-
elastic demand because it has no close substitutes. 245 Additionally, be-
cause milk is a relatively minor expense in terms of a person's overall
242. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 71-72. Price elasticity of supply
measures the percentage change in the quantity supplied divided by the percentage change
in price. Id. The main determinant of supply elasticity is the extent to which production
may be increased. Id. For example, Monet paintings have a perfectly inelastic supply. See
id. No matter how high the market price of Monet paintings rises, their supply will remain
unchanged. See id.
243. See id. at 744 (discussing the determinants of the economic concept of elasticity of
demand). Samuelson defined price elasticity of demand as, "[a] measure of the extent to
which quantity demanded responds to a price change." Id. The elasticity of demand is
determined by the following factors: the importance of the commodity in consumers' budg-
ets, whether the item is a necessity or luxury, whether consumers may substitute other
items in his budget for the one in question, and whether a consumer may increase or lower
their demand for the product quickly. Id. at 70-71. Insulin for example illustrates Samuel-
son and Nordhaus's discussion of the economic concept of elasticity of demand because
insulin probably has a perfectly inelastic demand curve. See Id. Consumers of insulin may
not: (1) substitute other drugs for insulin; (2) devise a budget without purchasing insulin;
(3) lower or raise their personal demand for the drug; and (4) insulin is very important to
its consumers. See id. Demand for gum is an illustrative example of high demand elasticity
because consumers may: (1) substitute other types of candy for gum; (2) easily remove gum
from their budget; (3) decide to consume more or less depending on the price of gum; and
(4) terminate their consumption of gum because it is not a necessity. See id.; PINDYCK AND
RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 319-22 (analyzing the economic impact of a tax or subsidy
on consumers, producers and the product's market price).
244. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 319-23 (discussing the relative
burdens placed on consumers and producers when a particular product is taxed). Consum-
ers predominately bear the burden of a tax if consumer demand is relatively inelastic com-
pared to supply. Id. In the present case, if one applies Pindyck and Rubenfield's
reasoning to the Massachusetts pricing scheme, consumers will pay for most of the tax
because milk consumers generally are unwilling to proportionately reduce their intake of
milk as prices rise. See id. The Massachusetts milk supply is very elastic because produ-
cers of milk will respond quickly to changes in the market price by substantially reducing
or increasing the amount sold to Massachusetts suppliers. See id.; BAUMER, supra note
163, at 206 (providing that the demand for milk is relatively inelastic). All other things
being equal, this occurs because suppliers of Massachusetts milk typically would sell their
milk to other states if the incidence of the tax fell on them. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD,
supra note 238, at 319-23.
245. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 464-65 (discussing the economic concept of de-
mand elasticity). For example, to further illustrate Arnold's theory, assume a consumer
regularly purchases insulin and aspirin. See id. Next assume, the prices of both products
rise dramatically and the consumer must decide whether to continue purchasing the prod-
ucts. See id. Acetaminophen and ibuprofen easily may be substituted for aspirin. See id.
Insulin, however, has no close substitutes. The consumer can be expected to consume less
aspirin as she shifts her consumption to other pain relievers. See id. Her consumption of
insulin, however, is unlikely to decline because she cannot -substitute other drugs for insu-
lin. See id. (discussing the role substitute goods play in determining the price elasticity of
demand for a product).
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budget, its demand typically will be less elastic.246 In fact, because of
these factors, demand for fluid milk is relatively inelastic.247
In addition, the price elasticity of milk supply in Massachusetts, in the-
ory is very elastic.248 The market has a highly elastic supply curve249 be-
cause all producers have the option of selling their milk in other states.
They would not, therefore, choose to provide milk in Massachusetts for a
lower price than they can receive by selling it outside the state.250 Due to
the relatively inelastic price demand and elastic supply for fluid milk, the
incidence of the tax more than likely fell on Massachusetts consumers
and a lesser degree on dairy dealers.25'
246. See id at 465-66. Consumers are less likely to change their consumption of an
inexpensive item, as opposed to an expensive item, in the face of price increases. Id. Ar-
nold's reasoning may be demonstrated by watching consumer demand decrease less in re-
sponse to a 5% increase in the price of paper clips than to a 5% increase in the price of
housing. See id. (discussing the economic concept of price elasticity of demand).
247. ARTHUR A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 275 (1936). Cooperative pric-
ing allows higher prices for fluid milk, which has a relatively inelastic demand, while al-
lowing for a lower price on surplus milk, which is used for cheese, ice cream, evaporated
milk, etc. and has a more elastic demand. Id.; see also Dairy Study, 58 Fed. Reg. 22514,
22520 (1991). The Commodity Credit Corporation of the United States Department of
Agriculture assumed in studies of federal dairy programs that demand elasticity remained
unchanged at -0.15 for the 1991/92 - 1996/97 period. Id. Therefore, if the price of milk
increased by 100%, demand would drop only by 15%. See id.; see also Baumer, supra note
163, at 206 (finding that because the demand for fluid milk is relatively inelastic, increases
in price lead to increased revenues). Part of the tax still falls on the dairy dealers because
consumer demand is not perfectly inelastic. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
The part of the tax that fell on the West Lynn Creamery provided a financial incentive for
their challenge of the pricing scheme. See id.
248. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing the price elasticity of
supply for milk); see also SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 70-71 (stating that
the more substitutes available for a good the more elastic the supply). By analogy, a
change in the price of milk in Massachusetts would cause a larger change in the quantity of
milk supplied by producers because producers may shift the supply of milk to in-state or
out-of-state dairy dealers. See id.
249. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 362 (stating that in a market
with numerous purchasers, an individual buyer will face a highly elastic supply curve). The
Massachusetts dairy market, one of 48 in the continental United States, competes for the
supply of milk with many other markets. See id.
250. See PINDYcK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 322. All things being equal, a
producer whose supply curve is perfectly elastic will not supply the good if he must pay any
tax. Id. This analysis does not factor in elements such as transportation costs and the
limited shelf-life of milk. See LINK, supra note 29, at 42. "When examining the effect of an
independent variable [such as a tax placed on milk suppliers], it is assumed that all other
factors that can affect the dependent variable are unchanged, so that the partial effect of a
change in the dependent variable under study can be measured." Id.
251. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 319-26 (discussing the economic
incidence of a tax). See Dairy Study, 56 Fed. Reg. 22514, 22520 (1991). The Commodity
Credit corporation of the USDA assumed in its economic analysis model of federal dairy
programs that a "large change in price would not affect the quantity of milk consumed by
much." Id. Thus, indicating milk's inelastic demand and elastic supply. See SAMUELSON
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B. The Pricing Scheme is Similar to a Tariff
The majority in Healy I maintained that the Massachusetts pricing or-
der was analogous to a tariff.2 52 The Court stated that, because tariffs are
so patently unconstitutional, states will only attempt to achieve their ben-
efits through other schemes. 253 While the Framers of the Constitution
granted the Supreme Court authority to invalidate tariffs,254 the Court
did not invalidate the Massachusetts pricing scheme under the Tariffs
Clause.255
Economically, a tariff generates a loss exceeding the revenues gained
by the government and the profits gained by in-state producers.256 In
addition, a tariff generally will raise the price 257 and the domestic produc-
tion of a good, while it usually lowers the amount imported and con-
AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 70 (stating that demand is inelastic where the
"[p]ercentage change in quantity demanded [is] less than [the] percentage change in
price").
252. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (1994).
253. Id. at 2211. The Court contends that a price floor such as the one held invalid in
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), was an attempt by New York to
achieve the tariff-like benefit of protecting in-state industry. Id.
254. See infra note 255 (quoting the Tariff's clause of the Constitution).
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The Tariff's clause of the Constitution states that:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's
(sic) inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
state on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of
Congress.
Id.
256. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 681 (explaining the economic
costs of a tariff). A tariff generates a deadweight loss to consumers, an economy composed
of higher domestic prices, inefficiency in production, and lost consumer surplus from the
raised price. Id. Consumer surplus is "[tihe difference between the amount that a con-
sumer would be willing to pay for a commodity and the amount actually paid." Id. at 733.
For example, the consumer who is willing to buy a television for $400 must pay $380 for the
television due to a tariff, despite the fact that the non-tariff market price for televisions is
$340. See id. at 681. The loss of consumer surplus, for this consumer due to the tariff,
equals ($380 - $340) $40. See id. Greater inefficiency results when a tariff protects domes-
tic producers because they can economically operate less efficient facilities that, under nor-
mal market conditions, would operate at a loss. Cf id. at 681-82. A tariff also results in a
transfer of wealth to the collecting government. Id.
257. Cf James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J. ITr'L L. & POL.
235, 237 (1993). Bovard analyzes the morality of quotas which raise the price of milk.
If the federal government could cause the bones of the elderly to break when they
fell, that would be denounced as the height of idiotic tyranny. But, as long as
federal policy consists instead of a quota that imposes the equivalent of a 170%
tariff on dairy imports, thereby insuring that many Americans will have calcium
deficiencies and weak bones, that is okay.
Id. Milk quotas have the same economic effect as a tariff, in that they increase prices to
the consumer. See JACKSON, supra note 24, at 42-43 (comparing the economic effects of
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sumed.258 A tariff is less likely to lower the amount of milk consumed,
however, because milk's demand is relatively inelastic.259 Thus, the
Court stated that "[l]ike an ordinary tariff, the tax is ... effectively im-
posed only on out-of-state products.
260
The Healy II majority did not invalidate the pricing scheme under the
Tariff Clause because the scheme did not lay "duties or imposts" on the
imported milk.2 61 Instead, Massachusetts consumers predominately paid
the costs of the tariff-like pricing scheme.262 The Court could not find
that a pricing scheme paid mainly by in-state interests was a duty or im-
post on imported milk.263
While the Court did not find a duty or impost, the Massachusetts pric-
ing scheme produced the same economic effects of a tariff: (1) an increase
in the price of the good; (2) a decrease in out-of-state production; and (3)
an increase in in-state production. 2' The milk tax increased the price of
out-of-state milk relative to the in-state milk sold at a subsidized price.265
The scheme added eight cents to the price of a gallon of milk, thereby
allowing less efficient in-state dairy farms to stay in business. 266 The ma-
tariffs and quotas). The funds collected by the domestic government under a tariff, how-
ever, flow to foreign firms as increased profits. Id.
258. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 680 (analyzing the economic
effects of a tariff). Compare supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the economic
rivalry which inspired the Commerce Clause) with SILK, supra note 26, at 135-36. Follow-
ing protectionist legislation by the United States, exports from the United States fell drasti-
cally due to retaliatory trade barriers. Id.; see U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING
WORLD ECONOMY, 291-92 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987) reprinted in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 38 (John H. Jackson et. al., eds., 1995) (claiming
that the signing of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff act by Herbert Hoover was the "most disas-
trous single mistake any U.S. president has made in international relations" and that it was
responsible for the severity of the Great Depression).
259. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (stating that an increase in price will not
cause a proportionate drop in the consumption of milk).
260. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2212 (1994).
261. Id. at 2211-12; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
262. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2213; see also supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text
(analyzing the incidence of the Massachusetts dairy tax).
263. See Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13; see also supra notes 248-51 and accompanying
text (concluding that in-state interests primarily paid the Massachusetts dairy tax).
264. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 681-82 and ARNOLD, supra
note 35, at 777-79 (discussing the economic effects of a tariff). See infra notes 252-63 and
accompanying text (comparing the economic effects of a tariff to the economic effects of
the Massachusetts pricing scheme).
265. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2209. The average production cost of raw milk for Massa-
chusetts farmers rose to an estimated average of $15.50 per hundred pounds, while the
average federal blend price fell to $12.64 per hundred pounds. Id. The federal blend price,
therefore, allowed significant price competition in Massachusetts. Id.
266. Alex Pham, Mass. Milk Tax Ruled Illegal, BosToN GLOBE, June 18, 1994 at B7.
James Bovard argues that "[p]rotectionism means robbing Peter to pay Paul or, more accu-
rately, robbing a thousand Peters to pay one Paul." See Bovard, supra note 257, at 239; see
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jority found that the purpose and effect of the pricing scheme was to di-
vert market share from out-of-state dairy farmers to in-state dairy
farmers.2 67 The subsidy to in-state dairy farmers would increase in-state
production. 268 The tax decreased the quantity of out-of-state milk con-
sumed in Massachusetts. 269 The subsidy of in-state producers also would
reduce the price that out-of-state producers could command.270 There-
fore, the Massachusetts plan, without accounting for externalities,27 1 suf-
fers from the same economic inefficiencies as a tariff.2 72 In short, this
similarity between the Massachusetts plan and a tariff is the crux of the
case, because markets do not naturally account for external costs and
benefits.273
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 280-83. Protectionism generally results in large finan-
cial benefits to a few producers and small financial losses to many consumers. Id. The
losses to consumers generally exceed the total benefits to producers. Id. Protectionist
legislation often is driven by large special interest groups, because consumers have too
small of a financial risk to justify fighting the legislation. Id.
267. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13.
268. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 719, 723 (stating that subsidizing an industry raises
the industry's production). Milk production increased in the United States as dairy farm-
ers responded to higher support prices issued by the Federal Government. Dairy Study, 94
Fed. Reg. 22514, 22516.
269. See Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13; SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at
332-33 (stating that a tax placed on a product will reduce the consumption of that product).
270. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 776 (stating that government subsidization of in-
dustry reduces the market price of their goods). But see Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13
(1994). The Federal government mandates a minimum price for milk. Id. This price floor
may have obscured the rise in the market price of milk in response to the Massachusetts
pricing scheme. Id.
271. See infra notes 288-99 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of subsidies
and taxes to internalize the costs of the external benefits of producing milk).
272. See supra notes 252-70 and accompanying text (comparing the economic effects of
a tariff and the Massachusetts pricing scheme); ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 723-24 (stating
that taxes and subsidies can result in the socially optimal output, despite, the fact that it
may result in higher prices and lower production of the product). Reaching the socially
optimal output often may be achieved only if the government imposes taxes or subsidies to
internalize the external costs or benefits of the product. Id.
273. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 310-15 (exploring the markets'
inability to account for external costs and benefits without government assistance); AR-
NOLD, supra note 35, at 723-24 (discussing the government's role in internalizing external
costs and benefits); PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 641. For example, a
program to clean up 2,000 acres of land for recreational use is worth $200,000 to a town of
10,000 citizens. Id. It would cost a private firm $50,000 to provide the program. Id. If the
firm could collect at least $5 from each resident then the market would provide the pro-
gram. Id. Every resident of the town would enjoy the benefits of the program whether or
not they contributed to the program. Id. In this situation, the market encourages people
to act as free riders. Id. Government action probably would be needed to effectuate this
socially desirable program. Id.
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C. The Court Invalidated the Pricing Scheme because of its Economic
Impact and the Perceived Motive of the Legislature
The Court invalidated the pricing scheme for two reasons: its eco-
nomic impact2 74 and its protectionist purpose.275 One commentator has
argued that by invalidating such legislation the Court primarily has pre-
vented the states from "engaging in purposeful economic protection-
ism. '  Many cases, however, suggest that the Court is invalidating only
state laws that principally burden out-of-state producers, because they
are unable to participate in the political process leading to the enactment
of burdensome statutes or regulations.277
Donald Regan has established a two-part definition to measure
whether state statutes are protectionist: If they were designed to "im-
prove[ ] the competitive position of local (in-state) economic actors" and
if "the statute (or whatever) is analogous in form to the traditional instru-
ments of protectionism," including the tariff then they are protection-
ist.27 8 The Healy If majority found that not only did the statute improve
274. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13. Out-of-state dairy producers lose business under
the Massachusetts scheme, while in-state producers gain market share. Id. at 2213. This
disparate impact led the Court to dismantle the tax and subsidy scheme. Id. at 2212-13.
275. Id. at 2213 (implying that a desire to protect the Massachusetts domestic dairy
industry motivated the Massachusetts pricing scheme). The Court held that the protection-
ist effect of the pricing scheme rendered it unconstitutional. Id.
276. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1092-93 (contending that the Court is invalidating state
statutes that are motivated by protectionist goals). But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at
37. Foreign Subsidies may hurt domestic (U.S.) producers, but this is just one of the risks of
doing business. Id. For taking this risk, producers are adequately compensated by the
possibility of supracompetitive prices. Id Professor Friedman contends that the "free en-
terprise system" offers both risks and benefits, and that it is fair for an industry to endure
the injury produced by subsidized foreign products because it is off-set by the possible
corresponding benefits of high profits. Id.
277. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2
(1938). The Court stated that:
[s]tate regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to
gain from those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or
to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those
within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even
though Congress has not acted.
Id. (citing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 497-98 (1877)). Compare Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendelton, 162 U.S.
650, 659 (1896); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498 (1888); and Wa-
bash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 575-78 (1886), with Baldwin v. Seelig, 294
U.S. 511, 524 (1934); New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 41-42 (1908); and
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1895). See Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910).
278. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1094-95 (concluding that where a state statute has a
protectionist effect without a corresponding motive, the Court should not invalidate it);
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia J., concurring)
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the competitive position of in-state dairy farmers, but the Court also anal-
ogized it to a tariff.279
The first element of the Regan test fails to distinguish the milk subsidy
from the vast number of subsidies that states routinely enact.2 s° For ex-
ample, the motivation for state funding of roads in rural Massachusetts
may have been to improve the competitive position of dairy farmers by
helping them transport their milk.28' Holding such indirect subsidies in-
valid under the Commerce Clause, would paralyze state governments.282
The second element of the Regan test is supported by Justice Stevens'
majority opinion, rejecting the Massachusetts pricing scheme.283 Clearly,
though, some subsidies do not produce the same anti-competitive results
as tariffs. 2 4 The majority, applying traditional economic analysis, rea-
soned that the tax (which decreased the competitive advantage of out-of-
state producers) and the subsidy (which increased the competitive advan-
tage of in-state producers) created a tariff-like trade barrier.285 But, the
(arguing that if Regan's theory is not correct as to how the Supreme Court is deciding
cases, then it should be).
279. Healy H, 114 S. Ct. at 2212-13 (noting that like a tariff, the Massachusetts scheme
neutralizes the advantages held by the place of origin).
280. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1094-95. The first element of the Regan test is
whether a statute designed solely to improve the competitive position of an in-state indus-
try. Id. Theoretically, this would include state expenditures for improving the infrastruc-
ture in-state industry utilized. See id.; infra note 282 (stating that general subsidies, such as
infrastructure maintenance, do not constitute unfair trade).
281. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp 834, 838 (1983) (stating
that the construction of roads and other similar general subsidies do not violate principles
of fair trade).
282. See id. If states are unable to bestow general subsidies such as building and main-
taining roads, the states would be impotent with respect to providing basic support to in-
dustry. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). James Madison stated that "[tihe powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State." Id.
283. See supra notes 170, 279 and accompanying text (writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens held the protectionist motivated pricing scheme invalid under the Commerce
Clause; this holding was consistent with professor Regan's Commerce Clause theory).
284. See infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text (discussing internalizing the costs of
external benefits of undeveloped land via the Massachusetts subsidization of in-state dairy
farmers).
285. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's conclusion
that the Massachusetts pricing scheme produced an unconstitutional tariff-like barrier);
SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 663. Professor Samuelson opines that the
principle of comparative advantage holds that goods should be produced in areas where
they may be produced most efficiently. Id. He states:
[T]he principle of comparative advantage holds that each country will specialize in
the production and export of those goods that it can produce at relatively low cost
(in which it is relatively more efficient than other countries); conversely, each
1018 [Vol. 44:977
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traditional economic analysis, used by the majority, fails to account for
external costs and benefits.286
D. Using Taxes and Subsidies to Internalize the Costs of
Environmental Externalities
Massachusetts' special commission contended that the dairy pricing
scheme helped preserve vast tracts of undeveloped land which produced
benefits for both Massachusetts as a whole and the state's tourism indus-
try.287 The undeveloped dairy land generated positive externalities. 28
The dairy farmers, however, were not compensated by the free market
for the positive external benefits that their land produced. 289 The failure
country will import those goods which it produces at relatively high cost (in which
it is relatively less efficient than other countries).
Id. (emphasis in original).
286. See supra notes 218-20 (discussing classical economic theory and its failure to ac-
count for externalities).
287. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2221 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (discussing the external benefits of undeveloped land).
288. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 719 (introducing the economic concept of positive
externalities). A positive externality is created by a group or individual action that creates
a benefit for others, while the benefit's producer is not adequately compensated. Id.; see
LEMOS, supra note 33, at 97-99 (discussing the philosophical argument in support of the
proposition that "beautiful tracts of wilderness" are intrinsically good). Positive emotional
responses to nature also provide evidence of nature's value. Id. at 181, 191. For example,
when an individual experiences a positive emotional response to the majesty of a cornfield,
but does not compensate the field's owner for the pleasure she derives from the sight, an
externality has occurred. See id. (discussing the philosophical concept of value); ARNOLD,
supra note 35, at 719 (explaining externalities in simple terms).
289. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 719-20 (discussing positive externalities). Professor
Arnold states that "[a]n externality is internalized if the person(s) or group that generated
the externality incorporate into their own private or internal cost-benefit calculations the
external benefits ... or the external costs. . . that third parties bear." Id. at 720 (emphasis
in original). The free market quickly develops a tourism industry centered around the
environment. JOSEPH J. SENECA & MICHAEL K. TAUSSIG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
184 (1974). The free market, however, fails to preserve the environmental attractions
which led to the land's development in the first place. See id. at 184-85. For example,
assume that several builders own 5 plots of land that surround a secluded but well-known
fishing lake. The people who visit the lake derive benefits from the wilderness and the
fishing. Cf PINDYcc AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 635-36 (discussing the problem
of overconsumption with respect to "common property resources" such as the fish in a lake
that no one owns). Each developer knows that the resort value of the land is greater if the
wilderness and undeveloped land is preserved.
Economically the example may be reflected by the following profit schedule that may be
collectively reached for: 1 resort = 100, for 2 resorts = 175, for 3 resorts = 200, for 4 resorts
= 190, and 5 resorts = 170. If a builder decides not to develop the land two things will
happen: first she will not recognize any of the profits that likely will come from develop-
ment; and, second, the other developers will reap higher profits because of the external
benefits of her undeveloped land. See SENECA AND TAUSSIG, supra, at 184-85. Assuming
that there are impediments that prevent bargaining, all the parties likely will develop their
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of the market to adequately compensate dairy farmers for maintaining
undeveloped land led to a lower amount of undeveloped land than is so-
cially optimal. 29  Because a subsidy can internalize an external CoSt,
2 9 1
subsidizing dairy farmers' maintenance of undeveloped land has the po-
tential to produce the socially optimal level of the resource.
292
Ideally, all land owners, including dairy farmers, would be compen-
sated for the external benefits that their land produces.293 One way to
adequately compensate individuals for the external benefits generated by
their land would be to lower the property taxes on undeveloped land.294
In an area such as the Northeastern United States, where property values
land because otherwise, they will not derive the economic benefits from the land's resort
potential. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960)
(discussing the transaction costs involved in making a deal with respect to negative exter-
nal costs). "[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains."
Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules - A Comment,
11 J. LAW & ECON. 67, 68 (1968) (emphasis in original). This example illustrates why the
optimal level of development frequently is not reached where numerous land owners oc-
cupy stretches of land with exceptional environmental and tourist value. See Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 24-27 (1982) (discussing the ineffi-
cient results that arise from noncooperative outcomes); see also ARNOLD, supra note 35,
at 721 (discussing the role of property rights in eliminating externalities).
290. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 204. Discussing the failure of the market to
produce the optimal level of undeveloped land. Id. at 204-05. Professor Friedman warns
that government attempts at solving market failures often fail to achieve a satisfactory
solution, thereby replacing market failures with government failures. Id.; see ARNOLD,
supra note 35, at 719 (displaying graphically how the market does not produce the optimal
level of goods that generate external benefits); see also Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Ex-
ternalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. LAW & ECON.
553, 558-61 (1993) (discussing the social problem of positive externalities and the problem
of bargaining obstacles that often prevent socially optimal outcomes).
291. KARL E. CASE, ECONOMICS AND TAX POLICY 121 (1986) (noting that carefully
designed taxes and subsidies could internalize external effects). A lower tax rate for unde-
veloped land may also help internalize the external costs of undeveloped land. ARNOLD
W. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND & RESOURCES One-71 (1974).
Such programs, however, are considered failures because they allow speculators to hold
onto land cheaply, until they believe it is profitable to build. Id.
292. See ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 723. The author notes that an externality can be
internalized by a subsidy or a tax. Id. The subsidy raises the production of a good by
internalizing the external benefits of that good while the tax lowers the production of a
good to internalize its external costs. Id.; see supra note 291 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the internalization of external effects).
293. See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text (discussing the resulting ineffi-
ciency if the economic position of producers of external costs or benefits is not properly
adjusted); ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 719 (graphically displaying the larger optimal output
of a good that produces positive externalities).
294. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on altering
the economic position of producers of external benefits through favorable tax treatment).
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are often high, 95 however, this may not be enough.296 An area with high
property values is precisely the type of region in which undeveloped land
would be in short supply, and the external benefits the land produced
theoretically would attain a high market price.29 7 Preservation of the un-
developed land associated with dairy farms could be achieved by com-
pensating dairy farmers through a subsidy derived from a milk tax. The
tax would be paid by the in-state consumers who receive the greatest ben-
efit from the undeveloped lands. 298 Theoretically, if the subsidy pay-
ments equalled the market price for the external benefits, an outcome
more efficient than the free market would be attained. 99
Additionally, under a Kantian analysis the Court's invalidation of the
Massachusetts pricing scheme may be flawed.3" Kant's categorical im-
perative states that an act is morally correct if it may be willed as a uni-
295. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2221 (1994) (Rehnquist C. J.,
dissenting).
296. See supra note 291 (contending that lower tax rates on undeveloped land may only
encourage speculators to hold the land until its market value has peaked). For example, a
state may not require a dairy farmer to pay property taxes on a farm that he operates at a
$20,000 a year profit. If the price of his land rises to $500,000 and the interest rate is 10%,
it would make economical sense for him to sell the land and live off the annual $50,000
interest payment. See Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2221 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As the
dairy business became less profitable and the price of land rose, dairy farmers in Massa-
chusetts began selling their land to developers. Id.
297. See JAMES C. HITE ET. AL., THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 17-
18, 23-24 (1972) (discussing the market analysis of the supply of environmental goods such
as the cost of a one-day vacation in Jamaica). The positive externalities of undeveloped
land are most valuable where the supply is low and the demand is high. Id. at 17-24 (apply-
ing the laws of supply and demand to the environment and environmental goods). For
example, New York City's Central Park theoretically generates high external benefits be-
cause the supply of undeveloped land in New York is low and the demand for such land is
presumably high. See id.; see also infra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefits of undeveloped land in urban environments). Therefore, a higher subsidy should
be issued for undeveloped land held in areas of high demand and low supply. See generally
SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 48-60 (discussing the effects supply and
demand have on a good's market price).
298. See supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text (discussing the potential under the
Massachusetts pricing scheme of compensating dairy farmers for their production of exter-
nal benefits).
299. A TASK FORCE REPORT SPONSORED BY THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHER'S FUND,
THE USE OF LAND: A CrIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 135-38 (William K.
Reilly ed. 1973) (arguing that selective placement or retention of undeveloped land would
lead to "higher economic and environmental values" of land); see ARNOLD, supra note 35,
at 719 (discussing and displaying the markets' inability to produce the socially optimal level
of goods that produce positive externalities); id. at 723 (explaining the use of taxes and
subsidies as one method of reaching the socially optimal level of production).
300. See infra note 301 and accompanying text (contending that the Massachusetts pric-
ing scheme passes Kant's categorical imperative because the scheme may help to reach the
socially optimal level of production, and thus, may be willed as a universal law).
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versal law.30 1 If every state taxed the consumption of farms and farm
products, in relation to the positive external benefits that in-state farms
generate, the result would be a nationwide internalization of the costs of
farm land.3" 2 In addition, the taxes paid by out-of-state interests, if any,
would be demonstrably incidental. 303 Under a Kantian analysis there-
fore, the Massachusetts pricing scheme may be willed as a universal law
and should not be invalidated by the Court as being inconsistent with an
economic union.30 4
To promote environmental preservation, state governments should be
permitted to enact fiscal policies that benefit the environment despite in-
cidentally burdening interstate commerce.30 5 Even if the Court correctly
301. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, reprinted in ETHICS:
SELECTIONS FROM CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITERS 183, 199, 204 (Oliver A.
Johnson ed. 6th ed., 1989). "There is ... only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law." Id. at 199. For example, cheating on exams may not be willed as a univer-
sal law, because, if everybody cheated on exams then exams would no longer serve their
intended function. See id. at 199-200 (discussing the philosophical theorem of the categori-
cal imperative). On the other hand, a law stating that one should not kill without justifica-
tion may be willed as a universal law. See id. at 199. In addition, one should not borrow
money knowing they will be unable to repay because to will this as a universal law would
render promises of repayment meaningless. See id. at 199-200. Tom L. Beauchamp, Ethi-
cal Theory and Its Application to Business, ETHICAL THEORY AND BuSINESs 1, 38 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 3d. ed. 1988). Stating that the theft of trade secrets
violates the categorical imperative. Id. Willing the theft of trade secrets as a universal law
would render useless the intellectual property rights that provide the incentive for pro-
gress. See id.
302. See HITE, supra note 297, at 70-72 (discussing the rising demand for finite environ-
mental resources and the markets' inability to allocate and preserve them efficiently); see
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 206-08 (recommending the utilization of market mecha-
nisms instead of arbitrary government regulations to help to maintain control over the
environment).
303. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 344-46
(1944). Arguably, the taxes paid by out-of-state dairy producers would be just as incidental
as the gross receipts tax in International Harvester. See id.
304. See Kant, supra note 301, at 199 (stating the categorical imperative). Compare
supra notes 287-303 (discussing the Massachusetts pricing scheme's potential to internalize
costs of the external benefits of undeveloped land); ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 723 (stating
that taxes and subsidies may be utilized to generate the socially optimal output of a good
that produces externalities) with supra notes 252-277 (discussing the majority's assertion
that the Massachusetts pricing scheme produced a tariff-like barrier). Tariffs, however,
may not be willed as a universal law. See supra note 258 (discussing the disastrous eco-
nomic consequences that followed the implementation of drastically higher tariffs in the
United States prior to the Great Depression).
305. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190-
91 (1938). Justice Stone commented that "[Flairly debatable questions as to ... reasona-
bleness, wisdom and propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the [state]
legislative body . I..." d  at 191. Michael P. Healy, The Preemption of State Hazardous
and Solid Waste Regulations: The Dormant Commerce Clause Awakens Once More, re-
printed in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY II 859, 894-96 (Allison P. Zabriskie, Thad-
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decided that the Massachusetts pricing scheme was protectionist, by in-
validating it the Court forbade an area of economic experimentation that
would allow both economic growth and the protection of public goods.
30 6
E. The Court Likely Will Continue to Invalidate Protectionist State
Subsidies that Produce Tariff-Like Economic Affects
Because of its adversity to protectionist legislation, the Court is un-
likely to embrace plans similar to the Massachusetts pricing scheme.30 7
Unfortunately, the organized producers of environmental goods are more
likely to influence beneficial environmental legislation than are the unor-
deus Bereday eds. 1993) (noting that the Court should consider reformulating the negative
Commerce Clause doctrine). Justice is "a proper balance between competing claims."
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 54 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 653-62 (1957) reprinted
in ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITERS 398, 399 (Oliver
A. Johnson ed., 6th ed. 1989). The issue in Healy I is between the competing claims of an
economic union and state sovereignty in determining local economic policy. Id.; West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (1994). John Rawls argues that society
misallocates its resources by spending more for production than on improving the quality
of life. Id. John Rawls stated:
Yet it is a fact that our industrial society is getting dangerously crowded, complex,
and putrid. We urgently need a change in social values-a shift in our goals from
increasing the quantity of production to improving the quality of life. Almost the
whole of our society and its institutions, business and governmental, is geared to
the growth of the old kind; the shift can occur only if we have what has correctly
been called 'a Copernican Revolution of the mind.'
Silk, supra note 26, at 199; cf BERNARD H. SIEGAN, OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY, 111-12
(1976) (discussing state and federal expenditures for the purchase and preservation of un-
developed land). Arguably, it is more efficient for the government to subsidize private
preservation of undeveloped land than to purchase the land and then manage it. See id.;
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 204-07 (stating that it is more efficient for the gov-
ernment to deal with externalities by utilizing market mechanisms than to implement regu-
lations to determine the optimal output of the externality or good).
306. See Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2223 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the
Constitution is consistent with state economic experimentation); cf. Bendix Autolite Corp.
Midwesco Enter. Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988) (stating that the Court could strike down
discriminatory laws, without considering any of their benefits); see ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, ORIGINAL REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURERS. HAMILTON PAPERS, 2nd
ser. (Dec. 5, 1791) reprinted in RICHARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE NATION 373 (1957) (contending that the government should subsidize
businesses to internalize costs of the external benefits of starting a new industry). Alexan-
der Hamilton's economic plan for the United States envisioned two funds; one to pay for
legislatively approved subsidies and a separate fund to promote agriculture, industry, com-
merce, and the arts. Id. at 374.
307. See supra notes 94-153, 274-77 and accompanying text (exploring the Court's
treatment of protectionist state legislation); see Regan, supra note 3, at 1206 (contending
that the Court is using the negative Commerce Clause to invalidate protectionist state
legislation).
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ganized and dispersed beneficiaries.3"' Even if the Massachusetts dairy
farmers were concerned only with gaining a competitive advantage and
not concerned about the environment, an objective analysis of the legisla-
tion would be no different.30 9 The Court, however, allowed some room
for the environmentally conscious legislator to maneuver.
310
The Healy II Court did not address whether the tax and subsidy pro-
gram would have been legal if the tax first had been placed in the state
general fund.31' Some scholars argue that if a subsidy is paid from the
state treasury, the courts should be deferential to the legislature, which is
more likely to consider the burdens and benefits of the subsidy.312 But,
308. See Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2215. In Healy II, the majority suggested that the polit-
ical process leading to the enactment of the Massachusetts pricing scheme was distorted,
because the most powerful in-state group opposed to a dairy tax was silenced by a corre-
sponding subsidy. Id. The majority suggested that despite the fact that two independent
regulations, the tax and subsidy, may each be legal under the Commerce Clause, their
combined effect may produce consequences not associated with the individual parts. Id. at
2214-15. However, the burden of the pricing scheme falls predominately on in-state con-
sumers and dairy dealers with a substantial in-state presence who may adequately repre-
sent any out-of-state opposition to the pricing scheme. See id. at 2221 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that the participation of special interest groups in the polit-
ical process has no relevance under dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 2219-20
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that the Chief Justice's distinction between
subsidies that violate and that do not violate the negative Commerce Clause are not based
on an inquiry into the role of special interest groups in the political process. Id. at 221; see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 32-33, 88, 191,193-94, 229, 279-86, 289 (discussing the incen-
tives for special interest groups to influence the political system, and exploring the general
public's inability to protect its diverse interests more actively); Choper, supra note 22, at
1584-85 (contending that special interest groups have a far greater influence in state legis-
lation than in federal legislation). This is exemplified by laws that discriminate against
outsiders for the benefit of local private or governmental interests. Id.
309. See supra note 308 (discussing the impact special interest groups have on state and
local legislation); see also supra notes 300-04 and accompanying text (discussing a philo-
sophical analysis of the Massachusetts pricing scheme in which the scheme would remain
the same regardless of which special interest group encouraged its passage).
310. See infra notes 311-41. (discussing the means not foreclosed by the Court to
achieve the desired ends of the Massachusetts pricing scheme). The states may reach the
desired ends of the pricing scheme by subsidizing the dairy farmers from the state's general
fund. Id.
311. Healy 11, 114 S. Ct. at 2209-18.
312. See Levmore, supra note 39, at 585 (contending that the state legislature applies a
more thorough cost-benefit analysis to a subsidy or preference that is taken from the
state's general fund, because the government rather than a private entity is paying); see
Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135-36 (noting that state legislatures ignore the external costs of
subsidies borne outside the state, by out-of-state producers who face a decline in price and
market share attributed to the subsidies); cf. Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2221 (Scalia, J., concur-




under the second element of the Regan test, the subsidy still would vio-
late the Commerce Clause because it generates the effects of a tariff.31 3
States receive the majority of their revenue from sales taxes. 314 Sales
taxes and use taxes315 subject out-of-state producers to additional
CoStS.3 16 It is impractical and probably impossible for a state tax system
to not impact out-of-state producers.317 If the general funds subsidize in-
state producers, it is likely that out-of-state interests would provide some
of the funds.
318
A pure subsidy, with no corresponding tax on the item produced,319
would pass the Regan test because the out-of-state producers would not
suffer any direct barriers to competition.32 ° Instead, the subsidy would
result in the accurate allocation of the in-state producer's comparative
advantage if the subsidy internalized an external CoSt. 321 Thus, the Court
313. See supra note 278, and accompanying text (stating the two elements of the Regan
test). A subsidy, whether it is paid directly by private entities or the government, would
still produce the same tariff-like effects condemned by the Healy H majority. See supra
notes 283-86 and accompanying text (discussing the economic effects of the Massachusetts
pricing scheme with respect to the second element of the Regan test).
314. See SAMUELSON AND NoRnHAus, supra note 1, at 332-33. States receive most of
their revenue through general sales taxes and taxes placed on gasoline, alcohol, and to-
bacco. Id.
315. All States Tax Guide (P-H) 250. All states except Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Oregon impose general state sales and use taxes. Id.
316. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 320-22 (discussing the economic
factors that determine what percentage of a sales tax is ultimately paid by producers).
Sales taxes imposed on goods produced out-of-state result in out-of-state producers paying
a portion of the tax. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the economic analysis used to
determine the incidence of a tax relating to the Massachusetts dairy scheme, see supra
notes 234-51 and accompanying text.
317. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 323. For example, states tax
gasoline to effectuate a use tax of state highways and impose costs on out-of-state produ-
cers that must ship their products in-state. See supra notes 312-13 (discussing the effect of
state sales taxes on out-of-state producers).
318. See supra notes 313-17, and accompanying text (discussing out-of-state sources of
in-state revenue). Because states' sales taxes and use taxes are ultimately paid, in part, by
out-of-state producers, the states' general fund include taxes paid by out-of-state produ-
cers. Id.
319. See Levmore, supra note 39, at 592-98 (discussing the Court's treatment of taxes
affecting interstate commerce). See Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S.
422, 427 (1947). The Supreme Court contended "[f]rom the Commerce Clause itself, there
comes, also, an abridgment of the state's power to tax within its territorial limits. This has
arisen from long-continued judicial interpretation that, without congressional action, the
words themselves of the Commerce Clause forbid undue interferences by the states with
interstate commerce." Id.
320. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (stating the two elements of the Regan
test). See Regan, supra note 3, at 1193-95. Professor Regan contends that the negative
Commerce Clause permits state spending on industry. Id.
321. See SAMUELSON AND NoRDHtAus, supra note 1, at 663. Comparative advantage
provides that states will specialize in the production of goods that it can produce at a
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should not, under the negative Commerce Clause, invalidate pure subsi-
dies created by state legislators.322
Finally, whether direct subsidies without corresponding taxes on out-
of-state producers violates the Commerce Clause is a policy question best
left to the wisdom of the states' legislative bodies,323 because subsidies
may be in the realm of economic experimentation,324 which is consistent
with the principles of federalism. 325 In addition, subsidies may be helpful
in producing the optimal level of environmental benefits.3 26 A direct sub-
relatively low cost. Id. When producers are compensated for their production of external
benefits, their production will adjust according to their true comparative advantage. See
id. (discussing the concept of comparative advantage); see also ARNOLD, supra note 35, at
720-23 (discussing the internalization of external costs resulting in a socially optimal
output).
322. See Regan, supra note 3, at 1193-97. Regan contends that some state spending
programs should not be invalidated under the negative Commerce Clause because they:
(1) do not obtrusively interfere with the market economy; (2) are not overly hostile toward
other states; (3) are costly to the state and are not "likely to damage the economy seriously
in the aggregate, if at all"; (4) often are beneficial to the nation and would be undertaken
by a state only if the benefits fall predominately on that state; and (5) are not likely to
result in the destructive retaliations associated with tariffs. Id. at 1194-95.
323. See Anson and Schenkkan, supra note 240, at 99 (concluding that "federalism de-
mands a respect for state decisions of political economy that the Court never has accorded
in traditional dormant commerce clause cases, a respect that the Court is institutionally ill
suited to reconcile with national economic concerns"); cf. Redish and Nugent, supra note
10, at 593. The states would prefer congressional to judicial oversight of interstate com-
merce because Congress is less likely to act. Id.; see supra notes 152-54 (discussing the
minimal likelihood of congressional action because Congress is preoccupied with other
matters).
324. See Levmore, supra note 39, at 586 (stating that Congress may regard non-ex-
ploitative state action as appropriate experimentation, consistent with the federal structure
of government); see also Alasdair Maclntyre, The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural
Lecture, 52 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 344, 352-53, reprinted in JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 239, 245-46 (James P. Sterba 2nd ed., 1992). A common concep-
tion of what is good for society is needed to reach the socially optimal allocation of re-
sources. Id. For example, too many resources are spent extending human life into a
mindless existence, while the young and the unborn are economically deprived. Id.
Critics of capitalism assert, however, that it is loaded in favor of such 'private'
goods as autos, soap, deodorants, watches, refrigerators, clothing, etc., and against
'public goods,' such as public television, public beaches, concert halls, museums,
symphony orchestras, ballets, parks, hospitals, medical services, public schools, or
decent homes for the aged.
See SILK, supra note 26, at 83.
325. Levmore, supra note 39, at 586. Professor Levmore contends that subsidies from a
general fund are within the realm of economic experimentation consistent with the princi-
ples of federalism. Id.
326. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729-30 (1973) reprinted in A PROP-
ERTY ANTHOLOGY 384, 391 (Richard H. Chused ed., 1993). The way to internalize an
external benefit of property is achieved best through a system of rewards. Id.; see also
ARNOLD, supra note 35, at 723-24 (illustrating how subsidies may be used to internalize
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sidy paid to the Massachusetts dairy farmers would increase the milk pro-
duction of in-state dairy farmers,32 7 and would reduce the Massachusetts
market share of out-of-state milk producers.3 28 The beneficiaries of a
subsidy designed to sustain in-state dairy farmers, as opposed to the Mas-
sachusetts pricing scheme, are not the out-of-state dairy farmers, but
rather, the dairy consumers who benefit from not paying the incidence of
the Healy II tax.329 Therefore, the effect of a direct subsidy with no cor-
responding tax is no more or less protectionist than the Massachusetts
pricing scheme.33 °
Justice Scalia would validate all subsidies which were issued from a
state's general fund.33' The Court's previous rulings regarding tax credits
and tax exemptions supports Justice Scalia's test.332 Under this bright
line test,3 33 Massachusetts could have placed the funds from the milk
dealer tax into the state's general fund and then issued a subsidy to in-
external benefits to produce a socially optimal output). In other words, a subsidy may
impose the true costs of production on dairy farmers. Cf. id.
327. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 322-23 (stating that the quantity
of a product will increase if the production is subsidized). The author does recognize that
subsidies risk overproduction and surpluses, however, farmers properly compensated for
the external benefits they produce would displace farmers producing in areas where there
is a surplus of undeveloped land. See ARNOLD, supra note 35 at 63 (stating that subsidies
increase production); see also id. at 723-24 (cautioning against the dangers of misjudging
the level of subsidization necessary to internalize the costs of an external benefit); see
supra note 297 (providing that under an efficient scheme of subsidies, areas where the
supply of undeveloped land is low and the demand is high, a larger subsidy should be
issued).
328. See Gergen, supra note 34, at 1135-36 (stating that subsidies of in-state producers
decreases the market share of out-of-state producers).
329. See PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 238, at 323 (explaining the economic
effects of a subsidy). "[TIhe benefit of a subsidy accrues mostly to consumers if [the price
elasticity of demand over the price elasticity of supply] is small .... " Id. Therefore, if
price elasticity of demand for milk is low, while the price elasticity of supply is high the
benefit of a subsidy would flow primarily to consumers. See id. However, much of the
subsidy may result in a deadweight loss because it is being issued to dairy farmers who may
not be efficient enough to compete in the free market. See id.
330. See supra notes 314-18, 324-30 (discussing the similar protectionist effects of subsi-
dies paid to in-state dairy farmers from the state's general fund, and subsidies paid from
segregated funds).
331. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205,2221 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
332. See supra notes 107-18, and accompanying text (discussing the Court's invalidation
of discriminatory taxes that burden interstate commerce, and their validation of nondis-
criminatory taxes affecting interstate firms).
333. See Healy II, 114 S. Ct. at 2211-12 (Scalia J., concurring). Justice Scalia argues that
the Constitution permits a state to subsidize its domestic industry from nondiscriminatory
taxes placed in the state's general fund. See id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia believes that
the effect of subsidizing from a segregated fund, would be to subsidize an industry with
discriminatory taxes, once the transaction was integrated. Id.
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state dairy farmers.334 Economically, this is a distinction without a differ-
ence. 335 The resulting economic effects that compelled the majority to
liken the pricing scheme to a tariff would still occur. 336 Politically, how-
ever, the electorate would be more likely to perceive the opportunity
CoSt 3 37 of the subsidy and subject the subsidy to a higher level of scru-
tiny. 338 This approach would allow states to burden out-of-state produ-
cers with the costs of subsidizing in-state interests.
339
The out-of-state dairy farmers arguably would not be unfairly affected
by any subsidy to in-state dairy farmers with or without a corresponding
tax.340 The state will be unable to foist the burden of the in-state tax on
the out-of-state dairy farmers, because the out-of-state dairy farmers can
sell their milk in numerous other markets.341 The out-of-state producers
only appear to be hurt when they are not similarly compensated for the
external benefits they produce.342
IV. CONCLUSION
The power to regulate commerce should rest with the governmental
bodies best suited for the job. External costs and benefits are very diffi-
334. See supra notes 202-04, 333 (discussing Justice Scalia's bright line subsidy test).
335. See supra notes 232-74 and accompanying text. The economic affects of the Mas-
sachusetts pricing scheme would not change if the proceeds from the dairy tax first were
placed in a general fund as opposed to a segregated fund. Id.
336. See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text (discussing the economic effects
that lead the majority to conclude that the Massachusetts pricing scheme was a tariff-like
barrier).
337. See SAMUELSON AND NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 743 (defining the economic
concept of opportunity costs). An opportunity cost is defined as "[tihe value of the next
best use (or opportunity) for an economic good, or the value of the sacrificed alternative."
Id.
338. See Levmore, supra note 39, at 585 (contending that a legislature is less likely to
spend money from the state's general fund because they can more adequately perceive the
opportunity costs of the program).
339. See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text (stating that the economic effects of
a subsidy on an industry are identical where funded by a nondiscriminatory tax taken from
a segregated fund or a general fund).
340. See supra notes 287-99 and accompanying text (analyzing the use of the Massachu-
setts pricing scheme as a means of achieving the socially optimal use of dairy farms). Sub-
sidies that internalize the costs of external benefits represent fair trade because such a
result is identical to the outcome had there been no externalities. See ARNOLD, supra note
35, at 719-20 (discussing the disparity between the socially optimal output and the market
output caused by external benefits).
341. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text (stating that both in-state dairy
farmers and dealers paid the dairy tax because the out-of-state dairy farmers had the op-
tion of selling their milk in numerous markets).
342. See supra notes 340-41 (explaining that subsidies that do not internalize the costs
related to external benefits may result in a disparity between the socially optimal output
and the market output).
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cult to measure because the market does not establish their value as it
does for private goods. Thus, value judgments must be made before ac-
tions may be taken to internalize these costs and benefits. These judg-
ments are most appropriately made and implemented by the legislature.
Economic experimentation, utilizing tax and subsidy schemes similar to
that in Healy II, may help to solve various market failures. Subsidies and
taxes, however, are often used with protectionist motives and may serve
to obstruct the economic union. Nonetheless, the benefits of economic
experimentation demand that the Court not invalidate state legislation,
attempting to correct market failures as it did in Healy I.
The Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence represents an
approval of a laissez-faire economy. The Framers of the Constitution
may have believed in this economic ideology. Policy decisions, however,
are meant to be determined by the people, not by the Court's determina-
tion that the Framers would have approved of a particular policy.
Congress needs to address whether pricing schemes designed to inter-
nalize external costs and motivated, in part, by protectionist goals violate
the Commerce Clause. Economic experimentation is both risky and ben-
eficial. Congress is unlikely to risk economic experimentation on the na-
tion unless there is evidence of beneficial results from the states. If
experimentation is prohibited at the state level then it may impede the
economic evolution of the United States.
George P. Patterson
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